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ABSTRACT  
 
This research aims to examine hate speech in the Egyptian Arabic language newspapers, 
through examining the front page of the three dailies, the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper, 
the privately-owned newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm and the partisan newspaper Al-Wafd. 
The study’s time span starts from June 30, 2012 to June 30, 2015. The analysis for the study 
is based on the framing and agenda-setting theories in order to find how hate speech is 
framed and whether the speech is affected by a governmental agenda. The research uses the 
quantitative method of content analysis to examine the total of 111 front pages. The research 
found that hate speech was used more by the privately-owned Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper 
followed by Al-Wafd party newspaper, and finally by the state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper. 
The major sources of hate speech were journalists who used hate speech in their own words 
in their writing and reporting, the major hate speech victims were Islamists followed by 
others and the major type of hate speech used was stereotype, and finally the media 
professionals generally did not try to combat hate speech.  
Key words: Hate speech, Egypt, newspapers, framing, agenda-setting.   
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Chapter I. 
 INTRODUCTION 
 “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice” were the theme of one of the major chants 
during the 25th of January 2011 revolution, when most Egyptians took to the streets to protest 
against an authoritarian regime. After 18 days of protests and after bloody clashes that caused 
injuries and took away lives, the then President of Egypt Mohamed Hosni Mubarak resigned. 
“Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011” and handed power over to the Head of the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi 
(Mendel, Aziz, Allam, Fattah & Mahmoud, 2013). 
As Egyptians “ended Mubarak’s prolonged authoritarian rule” (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012) many people were optimistic regarding achieving more political and social 
developments as well as creating a democratic life and having their demands met. However, 
some journalists in particular wished for a freer and more independent media. Journalism was 
one of the most important aspects that needed to improve (Elmasry, Basiony & Elkamel, 
2014). “After thirty years of dictatorship, many thought that going forward, all of their 
dreams for the country would come true—including the dream of an independent media” 
(Abdulla, 2014).  
However, these demands were not met in the media, nor in the political nor social 
sectors and the political turmoil has continued since then, starting with  Mubarak’s handing 
the power over to the SCAF and  electing the ousted President Mohamed Morsi, then ousting  
him after massive protests that took place on June 30, 2013 with the help and support of the 
then head of the Egyptian Military, Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi, then appointing the head of Egypt's 
Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, as an Interim President and then finally 
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currently, ending with the rule of  the elected President Al-Sisi. During all this period and 
under the succeeding governments, the political scene witnessed different protests, bloody 
clashes between protesters and security forces and the military, arrests, enforced 
disappearances, and many other human rights violations.   
Media freedom was also negatively affected before the revolution during the ruling of 
different governments, which will be discussed in details later, as journalists in Egypt 
generally faced censorship, violations and restrictions on freedom of expression. However, 
journalists sometimes witnessed a margin of freedom and were allowed to criticize the 
government, but without exceeding certain lines and some journalists were trying to fight 
back restrictions and violations.  
The media in Egypt currently faces unprofessionalism and as some argue, “hate 
speech” especially with the political turbulence and high polarization already existing. The 
newly discovered freedom after the January 25th revolution turned into chaotic expressions, 
spread of rumors and unsupported opinions (El Issawi, 2014). After the revolution, freedom 
of the media was very unstable and witnessed polarization and politicization (Elliott, Chuma, 
El Gendi, Marko, & Patel, 2016). The media became more polarized when Morsi was in 
power, especially between the Islamist and private or secularist media; this situation 
gradually deepened and was reflected on the society (Abdulla, 2014). Freedom was also 
affected during the rule of the different governments in power. For example, during the 
SCAF’s ruling period, bloggers, journalists and media institutions were subject to different 
violations (Abdulla, 2014). Also, during Morsi’s ruling period, there were attempts to silence; 
liberal news media outlets and laws were used to control opposing voices (El Issawi, 2014). 
Other violations were directed towards media institutions and media professionals (Abdulla, 
2014). During Mansour’s and President Al Sisi’s ruling periods, the case was not different as 
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both media personnel and institutions faced a number of abuses (Abdulla, 2014). 
Despite the fact that freedom of expression and freedom of the press are a vital part of 
the democratization process, it is clear that sometimes the media can be a disruptive tool that 
can arouse conflicts and spark violence (Elliott et al., 2016). In addition, journalism can be a 
tool to promote human rights; however, it can also be a tool that violates human rights when 
it uses hate speech (Rupar, 2012), and can also create biases and violence during war time 
(Hafez, 2011). For example, the media in Rwanda acted like a weapon and through spreading 
hate, was a major source for the 1994 genocide (Dallaire, 2007).   
I.1 Statement of the Problem  
Hate speech does not have a unified definition; however, different definitions were 
proposed, and will be discussed and analyzed later. However, a brief general definition was 
used in the “Glossary of Hate Speech in Egyptian Media,” a booklet that provides guidelines 
to media practitioners to avoid hate speech and to clarify that “criticizing individuals and 
groups is allowed but without incitement to violence, discrimination and/or rejecting others” 
(Eissa, Elias & Kasseb, 2016).  
This study will examine hate speech in the Egyptian Arabic language newspapers 
using the quantitative approach of content analysis. The study will examine the presence or 
absence of hate speech, the type of hate speech that is mostly used and those who use this 
speech (e.g. the sources or media practitioners) as well as who the major victims of hate 
speech are and if they change according to the ruling government. The span of the study will 
be from June 2012 until June 2015. The study will analyze hate speech in a state-owned 
newspaper, a partisan newspaper, and an independent/private newspaper.  
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I.2 Significance of the Research  
As hate speech encompasses different negative effects, this study is important for both 
academics and media professionals to enable them to know to what extent hate speech is used 
in the Egyptian newspapers and who the most vulnerable groups exposed to such speech are, 
as an initial step to help in spotting and combating this negative phenomenon, and therefore 
preventing the negative outcomes of hate speech.  
This research is also important because  a shortage in hate speech studies in Egypt           
exists, while some of the studies conducted, and which will be discussed in detail later mainly 
concentrate on a short time span like Al Sawt Al Hurr1, which examined different satellite 
TV channels  in a period of 15 days starting from the 10th to the 25th of September 2013. The 
study’s main focus is the ethical standards and professionalism of different segments of the 
programs aired in the channels under examination with hate speech being among them. 
Similarly, MENA Media Monitoring2 research investigated hate speech in the press of 
different countries in the Arab region  and focused on only three weeks from June 5 to 26, 
2014 in Egypt.  
Other research studies base their analysis on media and human rights reports and do 
not use scientific research, nor content analysis, nor a clear methodology and unit of analysis 
to spot and analyze the phenomena. For instance, Zahra’s (2014) work “I Hate You... The 
Hate and Sectarianism Speech in Media after Arab Spring” is mainly descriptive as it 
                                                 
1 Al-Sawt Al-Hurr is a media organization based in Cairo. It states in its website that they are 
partners with Al-Ahram, Al-Gomhuria, Middle East News Agency, SMEX and Free Press 
Unlimited. Their research is in cooperation with “Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies” 
(CIHRS). For further information check http://asahnetwork.org/en/  
 
2 MENA Media Monitoring is a Tunisian based media NGO. The part examining Egypt in 
their research is under the supervision of CIHRS. For further information check 
http://menamediamonitoring.com/en/  
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discusses other reports by human rights organizations and does not conduct a new scientific 
research. Similar to this, is “Hate Speech, key concept paper” presented by Elliott et al. 
(2016) which only reviews other studies and reports by media organizations. 
Further research including surveys and in-depth interviews should be conducted to 
understand the effects of hate speech messages on individuals and groups targeted by those 
messages and understand, as well, how hate speech messages affect the audience exposed to 
them and the latter’s attitudes towards these messages and towards victims of hate speech.    
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Chapter II 
EGYPTIAN MEDIA BACKGROUND 
 
II.1 Egyptian Media Landscape 
The Egyptian news industry is generally divided between independent media, state-
owned media that is controlled by the state, social media (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012), and 
partisan newspapers (Rugh, 1987). Each one frames the news differently (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012).  
The media in Egypt has continually played a vital role in both Egypt and the Middle 
East (Abdulla, 2014). Egypt is the Arab country with the strongest global media influence 
(Elena, 2016). This is despite the fact that the Egyptian press historically fluctuated between 
being an independent press and being totally controlled by the state (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012). 
Historically Egypt was the innovator of the broadcast sector in the Arab world and 
was the first country to introduce the “first state-run radio” in 1934 (El Issawi, 2014). In 
1960, the first broadcast TV was launched, while in 1970, the state became the owner of the 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), which was to control and regulate all the 
channels (El Issawi, 2014). Egypt was also the first country in the Arab region to launch its 
satellite TV channel, “the Egyptian Space Channel (ESC), on Arabsat in 1990.” Then it even 
launched its own satellite “Nilesat” in 1996 as a “joint public-private company operating 
Egyptian satellites” (El Issawi, 2014). Later in 2000, the second Nilesat was launched, then 
broadcasting regulations changed and this gave the chance to private Egyptian and foreign 
broadcasters to operate using satellites (Naomi, 2014).  
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II.2 Historical Background  
 
The Media under Abd El-Nasser’s Ruling Period - (1954-1970)  
The media was totally owned by the state after Egypt’s independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1952 (El Issawi, 2014). After the 1952 coup d’état by “the Free Officers,” 
headed by Gamal Abd El-Nasser and Mohamed Naguib, a military person was assigned to 
each newspaper in order to censor publications and inform journalists about what the “Free 
Officers” were proposing for Egypt. However, “The Free Officers were not clear about their 
policies” (Dabous, 1993). Censorship was sometimes lifted for short periods and imposed 
back, but generally Nasser’s ruling period witnessed rigid censorship (Dabous, 1993). When 
Nasser officially became the President, leftist journalists were active in most of the media 
outlets (Rugh, 1987). The media was used by Nasser “to promote his radical ideology of 
socialism, anti-imperialism, and Pan-Arabism” (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla, 2016). 
After Nasser nationalized the media on May 24, 1965 (El Issawi, 2014), it became a 
tool controlled by the government “through different legal and administrative instruments.” 
The main role of the state-owned media was to proclaim the government’s messages and 
promote its regional role (El Issawi, 2014). Nasser’s ruling period was a totalitarian one 
(Hafez, 2008) and was aggressive against journalists, as he silenced and jailed oppositional 
journalists (Rugh, 1987). However, sometimes, journalists were allowed to write 
investigations about political issues to pretend there was freedom, but journalists were always 
under threat (Dabous, 1993). 
The state-owned six print publishing houses, “Al-Ahram, Al-Hilal, Rose El-Youssef, 
Al-Akhbar, Al-Tahrir, Al-Qawmiyya Lil Tawziee,” produced “55 daily weekly and monthly 
print publications,” and were managed by the government (El Issawi, 2014). The mission of 
these publications was set by the “Press Law” which supposedly offers freedom of expression 
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to all opinions, but these opinions were really a propaganda tool for the government. Licenses 
to operate were denied to any private media outlet and governmental control of the media 
increased (El Issawi, 2014). Besides, political parties were closed down as were their 
publications (Hassan, 2013). Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Tahrir, prominent publishing 
houses, monopolized the distribution and publishing services and this allowed them to have 
financial advantages (El Issawi, 2014). Similarly, the broadcast sector of the ERTU was 
monopolized by the state. It included “30 TV stations and nine radio networks” and were run 
by bureaucratic practices. (El Issawi, 2014).   
II.3 Media under Al-Sadat Ruling Period - (1970-1981) 
Unlike Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat showed more tolerance for criticism and political 
discourse (Rugh, 1987). The Law of the Press was adjusted in the early seventies and allowed 
oppositional parties to publish their newspapers, which had extreme ideological tones, but 
broke the previous media monopolization imposed by Nasser’s government. However, 
granting a license was a special privilege and sometimes applicants never received a reply to 
their requests to operate (El Issawi, 2014). Party newspapers faced financial difficulties as 
well as problems with the government and did not have a large circulation (Rugh, 1987). 
However, the National Democratic Party (NDP) sponsored by Al-Sadat, and established late 
in 1978, published “Mayo” weekly newspaper, which favored the government, was well-
financed and received exclusive information and interviews with the President (Rugh, 1987).  
Similar to Nasser’s period, under Al-Sadat’s government, the state owned and 
supervised all media outlets and used them to support the government, while the private 
media outlets were illegal (Harper, 2014). In 1974, Al-Sadat’s policies towards the West 
were reflected in the media as he started to criticize the Soviet Union and was in agreement 
with the West. “Nasserites, Marxists, and other leftists in the press diminished” while 
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journalists previously jailed or exiled during Nasser’s ruling period were now given 
responsible positions in the press (Rugh, 1987).  
The government reduced restrictions on the press and some journalists went as far as 
reporting cases of official corruption; they further engaged in political discourses, media 
freedom, and other issues (Rugh, 1987). The censor was also no longer present in news 
rooms (Hassan, 2013). In the late 1970s, the “New Wafd” opposition party newspaper was 
established but suspended shortly afterwards. Opposition papers were aware that they could 
not exceed the limits because they “were printed by state-owned printers and circulated by 
state-owned distribution companies” (Hassan, 2013). Starting 1979, oppositional voices 
flourished, but later in 1981, Al-Sadat cracked down on opposing voices and “silenced or 
jailed” many critics and prominent journalists from both right and left sects (Rugh, 1987). 
Only ‘Mayo’ and ‘Al-Ahrar’, a mildly oppositional paper affiliated with the rightist “Liberal 
Party,” continued publication (Rugh, 1987).   
As Al-Sadat’s ruling period witnessed some political freedom and press freedom, the 
predominant characteristic of this period was still suppressive, but still not as far or as much 
as during Nasser’s ruling period (Elmasry, Basiony & Elkamel, 2014). 
II.4 Pre-Revolution Media  
Media under Mubarak’s Ruling Period - (1981-2011) 
 
After Al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Hosni Mubarak took power and imposed strict 
control over the press as per the emergency law, but later he reduced the control when the 
situation was more stable (Rugh, 1987). In the mid-1980s, Mubarak was encouraging free 
speech but in the meantime, he was requesting journalists not to go too far as he criticized the 
press for “agitating the mass” and “killing democracy” (Rugh, 1987). Mubarak declared that 
he would not restrict media freedom and would allow the criticism of governmental officials 
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(Ramaprasad & Hamdy, 2006). He further released most journalists that had been imprisoned 
by Al-Sadat, and permitted writers that had been stopped and publications that had been 
banned to operate again. The New Wafd became Al-Wafd weekly newspaper and earned 
huge success; more independence also appeared in state-owned newspapers, Al-Ahram, Al-
Akhbar, Al-Gomhouria, but these still favored the government (Rugh, 1987). “Due to indirect 
restrictions, government newspapers have since dominated the scene” (Davie, Dick, Bashri, 
Galander, Hamdy & Pierre, 2013). 
Mubarak continued to control the press (Elmasry, Basiony & Elkamel, 2014), with 
state-owned newspaper editors in-chief being assigned by the Shura Council “and being 
always closely tied to the regime” to guarantee that any coverage will be biased to the 
government and that there will be “extensive coverage of Mubarak’s every move within the 
rhetoric of the supreme leader, the father guru, and the wise protector of the state and the 
people” (Abdulla, 2014).  
However, during the mid-1990s, privately-owned newspapers started to be established 
(Mendel, Aziz, Allam, Fattah & Mahmoud, 2013). These introduced different ways of 
reporting the news by focusing on daily problems and peoples’ needs more than on 
governmental activities (El Issawi, 2014). Yet, getting a license to publish was hard as 
applicants had to “be cleared by all of Egypt's security and intelligence agencies” (Amin, 
2006). Independent newspapers were also owned by businessmen endorsed by the 
government (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper was established in 
2005 (Harper, 2015) and was the “first independent daily newspaper” owned by a group of 
businessmen. Other privately-owned newspapers followed (Cooper, 2008). Mubarak took 
some measures towards promoting private media and this was believed to be due to pressure 
from the United States, and the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks (Cooper, 2008). 
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Mubarak encouraged oppositional political parties to publish their newspapers (El 
Shaer, 2015). As the 1984 parliamentary elections approached, oppositional newspapers 
played a vital role regarding economic, political and social issues since they used to criticize 
the government, but without directly attacking Mubarak (Rugh, 1987).  In addition, 
journalists practiced self-censorship and avoided criticizing the army, human rights abuses 
and security forces, since they were exposed to governmental pressures (Amin, 2006).  
Oppositional journalism was allowed to operate; however, access to governmental 
information, and interview requests with governmental officials were mostly refused, and this 
affected those newspapers’ credibility among the public (Amin, 2006). Opposition 
newspapers also lacked public support due to “the absence of true democratic practices and 
political participation,” “the high illiteracy rate in Egypt which limited the press’s reach, and 
the lack of trust in the political parties that published them. This limited their credibility in 
the eyes of the Egyptian people” (El Shaer, 2015).   
Radio and television were more liberal than before, but they were still governmental 
mouthpieces (Rugh, 1987).   
Dream TV was the first private satellite TV channel licensed by the government in 
2001 and was followed with other channels, mostly owned by Mubarak’s acquaintances.   
These mainly aired entertainment programs and were banned from presenting news (Harper, 
2014).    
The introduction of private satellite television, the establishment of independent 
newspapers, the introduction of private media, and the availability of the Internet during the 
last days of the Mubarak era changed the media landscape from a one-tone media to a more 
divergent one (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). The presence of the new wealth and the divergence 
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in the media created vibrant but distinctive grounds between private and governmentally- 
owned media, between the suppression of freedom and fighting back (Hamdy & Gomaa, 
2012) in addition to the almost chaotic features between the competing “official and popular 
voices” (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).  
While the media scene seemed more liberalized, the government had the freedom to 
take away the license from media owners who crossed the limits imposed by the government 
(Harper, 2014). Different abuses were directed to journalism as the law allowed the 
government “to respond to media coverage it dislikes, with dismissal, closures of papers, 
fines, and imprisonment” (Amin, 2006).  
Mubarak’s government used different tools to mute or at least lessen critical opinions 
despite the liberalization wave (Elmasry, Basiony & Elkamel, 2014). For example, the 1996 
law permitted media freedom, but allowed penalties against journalists “who cross the 
boundaries of acceptable reporting.” These boundaries were general and were defined by the 
authorities (Amin, 2006). Before the January 25th revolution, the constitution protected 
media and speech freedom in Articles 47 and 48 but certain laws restricted this freedom and 
hindered journalists from working freely. Approximately 35 articles in different laws 
imposed penalties that went from fines to imprisonment (El Issawi, 2014). The Emergency 
Law further provided the tools to breach the basic freedom defined in the constitution (Amin, 
2006). This law was used to control the media under the pretext “of national security or 
public order and tried offenders in military tribunals with limited rights to appeal” (El Issawi, 
2014).  
The Committee to Protect Journalists placed Mubarak among the 10 worst offenders 
of the press in 1999.  “A series of jailings under the provisions of the Mubarak-approved 
press law and the censorship and closure of newspapers marked a sharp deterioration in the 
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climate for press freedom in his one-man 18-year rule” (Committee to Protect Journalists 
[CPJ], ND)  
While the media was not free during this era, social media was used by citizens 
striving for a free space to express their different points of view (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).  
II.5 The Media During the 18-day Revolution - (25 January-11 February 2011) 
 
 During the 18 days of the 25th of January revolution, journalists from different media 
outlets including “Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, The Associated Press, the BBC, CBS, CNN and 
Danish TV” were attacked while reporting in the field.  A journalist was directly murdered by 
a sniper (Harper, 2014).  
State TV was biased, with the main background scene on TV only showing the Nile, 
and ignoring the fact that protesters were being killed nearby. State TV also praised Mubarak, 
belittled protesters and accused them of various violations and used negative descriptions 
including being “kids performing sexual orgies in Tahrir Square” and “being agents of 
foreign governments” (Abdulla, 2014).  Despite this, some media professionals in state TV 
tried to fight back and threatened to quit if they were not allowed to cover the protests against 
Mubarak. In addition, state-owned media newspaper editors faced different pressures as two 
journalists from Al-Ahram newspaper were killed (Abdulla, 2014). When the situation 
seemed to be leaning towards the revolution, editors too started to change and praise 
revolutionaries (Abdulla, 2014).  Right after Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011, the 
state media started to praise the new power and the revolutionaries despite its denial of the 
existence of a revolution (El-Issawi, 2014). 
It is important to note that on the 25th of January, the government tried to block 
Twitter and Facebook but people found alternative ways to access them. As a result, on the 
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28th, of January, access to the Internet and to mobile phones was cut all over Egypt but 
resumed later (Abdulla, 2014).    
II.6 Post-revolution  
Supreme Council of Armed Forces - (12 February 2011 – 29 June 2012) 
After the 25th of January revolution, some media practitioners thought they would 
gain more freedom (Zahra, 2014). During the first weeks of the SCAF’s ruling period, which 
lasted from February 12, 2011 until June 29, 2012, they claimed that TV will broadcast with 
no need for security license approval.  Sixteen “private satellite television channels started 
operating.  When the Ministry of Information, which was one of the most powerful tools used 
by the government (El Issawi, 2014), was abolished in February 2011 (Abdulla, 2014; El-
Issawi, 2014), the supporters of freedom of expression were delighted but their delight did 
not last long (Abdulla, 2014). Despite the change, some limitations were applied.  For 
instance, the state media started to praise the revolutionaries and invited them to appear in 
interviews in the press and on TV “as long as that did not contradict the glorification of the 
army.” The army was also framed in a certain way as the media also portrayed it as the 
protector of the revolution (Abdulla, 2014).   
However, everything changed later when the government started to oppose people’s 
dreams and the media started to favor the SCAF and defame and belittle revolutionaries. At 
that point, the dream for a free media diminished and the Ministry of Information was 
returned (Abdulla, 2014) by the SCAF on July 12, 2011 (El-Issawi, 2014).  
Bloggers and journalists who dared to criticize the military were subjected to 
“military trials and investigations” (Abdulla, 2014). News institutions were attacked, 
channels were sometimes stormed and private channels fired presenters for criticizing the 
military such as in July 2011, when businessman and owner of Dream TV, Ahmed Bahgat, 
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fired Dina Abdel Rahman, talk show host, for reading an anti-SCAF article on the air 
(Abdulla, 2014; El Issawi, 2014). Additionally, journalists covering protests were physically 
harmed (Abdulla, 2014). The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) stated that abuses 
against bloggers and journalists were more than hundreds in number (Abdulla, 2014). For 
example, the blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad was sentenced to three years for offending the 
military after he wrote an article condemning “the military for not being transparent in its 
decision-making” (CPJ, 2011).  
It is important to clarify that Law number 313 which passed in 1956 and was 
amended in 1967 protected the army against questioning and limited reporting about them (El 
Issawi, 2014).  A military editor in all media outlets was responsible for covering army-
related events and he was usually approved by the military (El Issawi, 2014).  
II.7 The Media under Morsi’s Rule - (30 June 2013 – 3 July 2013) 
Similarly, the media during Morsi’s ruling period, which lasted from June 30, 2012 
until July 3, 2013 was not in a better condition. More controls over mass media were 
practiced as opposed to Morsi’s promises in his election campaigns (Mansour, 2015). There 
was an aggressive relationship between his government, represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB), and private media outlets (El Issawi, 2014). Private and state media were 
further divided into “Islamist and non-Islamist” groups (Freedom House, 2013). The media, 
described as liberal, asserted that they faced attempts to mute them, while the MB 
government demanded media “purification” and commented that media professionals were 
distributing lies and inflaming anger among people (El Issawi, 2014).      
The government used suppressive laws that were previously referred to under 
Mubarak’s government to control opposing opinions (El Issawi, 2014). A “number of court 
cases were brought against journalists and media practitioners for defamation of the 
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President” (Abdulla, 2014) and their number reached more than 20 criminal cases only within 
the first six months of Morsi’s presidency (Harper, 2014). Other cases brought to court were 
cases of defamation of the judiciary, defamation of the military, and defamation of Islam or 
blasphemy (Abdulla, 2014) which increased in this period (Arabic Network for Human 
Rights Information [ANHRI], 2013) in addition to cases of “publishing or broadcasting false 
news and inciting hatred” (Abdulla, 2014). During the first 100 days of Morsi’s presidency, 
around 40 violations targeted freedom of speech (ANHRI, 2013). During the last 100 days of 
his rule, “writers, journalists, newspapers and satellite channels” also faced different cases of 
violation and harassment (ANHRI, 2013).  
Moreover, a number of journalists were attacked, kidnapped, harassed, beaten, and 
seized by the “regime or by regime- affiliated thugs” (Abdulla, 2014). Other abuses in 
Maspero included “referral to the Public Prosecution and administrative investigations for 
arbitrary salary deductions, suspension from work, prohibition of access to the workplace, 
cessation of a program or change of its identity” (El Issawi, 2014).   
Similar to the SCAF and the Mubarak eras, the newly-appointed Minister of 
Information was considered to be the closest supporter to the Muslim Brotherhood (Mansour, 
2015). Besides, control over state-media increased through the appointment of Morsi’s 
supporters to leading positions (Mansour, 2015). Editors-in-chief of state newspapers were 
appointed by the Shura Council, which was dominated by Islamists (Abdulla, 2014; Freedom 
House, 2013). As the MBs were trying to appoint new leaders for state media, monopolize it 
and manipulate its content (El Issawi, 2014), the situation was not really bright or clear for 
the media as many professionals were still allied with Mubarak’s government (Abdulla, 
2014). Due to the shortage of supporters, the MB faced difficulty in appointing media 
practitioners affiliated with them from among the existing staff (El Issawi, 2014). What was 
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clear, however, was that loyalty to the people was absent while loyalty to the government was 
strong (Abdulla, 2014). The government used to interfere with the state media’s work even 
regarding small details. When some tried to combat this, they were penalized by the 
government (Abdulla, 2014). Some state media journalists were investigated for allowing 
oppositional voices to appear on air, for departing from the script and for covering anti-MB 
protests in a sympathetic way (Freedom House, 2013). However, private media was trying to 
condemn violations in different ways. For example, “in December 2012, five television 
channels and twelve newspapers went on strike on the same day to protest against Morsi’s 
constitutional declaration and the draft constitution, both of which curtailed media freedom” 
(Abdulla, 2014).  
During this period, the media witnessed high polarization mainly between Islamists 
media outlets and secularist and private ones (Abdulla, 2014). The Brotherhoodization of the 
media was a major topic of discourse in state media (El Issawi, 2014). As with the 
Brotherhoodization of the state, the expression was highly used in secular media and 
indicated the fear that MB members would take over power in most of the important 
governmental positions (Abdulla, 2014), and would control the nation’s institutions to impose 
the conservative policies they embrace (El Issawi, 2014). 
Another term used was “Muslim Brotherhood militias” which mainly denoted MB 
members who used to attack protesters in anti-governmental marches. In spite of this 
polarization, these channels used to conduct interviews at evening talk shows with guests 
affiliated with the MB in order to allow them to express their opinions (Abdulla, 2014).   
On the other hand, Islamist channels rarely gave the chance to “non-Islamists” to 
express themselves. They described non-Islamists as Mubarak “remnants” and spies for other 
 24 
countries. Islamist channels further used terms such as “atheists” against non-Islamists and 
suggested that anything anti-MB is also anti-Islam (Abdulla, 2014).   
Journalists generally experienced harassment and violations from both the authority 
and MB allies, starting June 30, 2013 (Abdulla, 2014). These violations involved “chasing, 
detaining, and beating journalists, sometimes severely, armed robbery, shooting with birdshot 
and damaging cameras and equipment” (Abdulla, 2014). 
II.8 The Media under Mansour’s Ruling Period – (3 July 2013 –8 June 2014) 
Some argue that after isolating Morsi, freedom of the media became as poor as during 
Mubarak’s era (Webb, 2014), and the media continued to serve the government and not the 
citizens (Abdulla, 2014). During Adli Mansour’s ruling period, from July 3, 2013 until June 
8, 2014, violations continued as journalists were imprisoned, faced military trials and some 
were even murdered (Abdulla, 2014). It is further asserted that the year 2013 was the 
“deadliest” year “for journalists in Egypt.” Eight reporters were murdered during the forced 
dispersal of the Rabaa Al-Adawiya sit-in while four other reporters were killed in other 
clashes throughout the year (Harper, 2014). 
State, oppositional and independent media faced restrictions and hazards (Webb, 
2014). These incidents sparked fear in some journalists and reduced their ability to cover 
politics (Abdulla, 2014).  
A few hours after ousting Morsi, violations against the media started. Some TV 
channels affiliated with the MB were shut down by the military. “Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr” 
was stormed on-air and five employees were arrested (Abdulla, 2014). The Misr 25 channel 
owned by MB was also closed for inciting to violence (Harper, 2014). Some officials said 
that Al-Jazeera exposed the country’s national security and affairs to risk (Abdulla, 2014). 
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Later the court ruled that some Islamist channels including Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr are 
operating illegally and do not have the required licenses, thus they ruled to have their 
operation banned (Abdulla, 2014). In the same month, the Freedom and Justice party 
newspaper, affiliated with the MB party, was closed (Abdulla, 2014). Some religious 
channels that were launched after the revolution and tackled politics were also closed after 
Morsi’s isolation. They were accused of disseminating extremism, targeting women’s rights 
and Christians (El Issawi, 2014) The MB depicted the opposition as being “infidels, traitors, 
and “fulul” [remnants of the old regime]” (Harper, 2014).  
A few weeks after the isolation of Morsi, state and some private TV channels “ran a 
graphic banner with the Egyptian flag that stated “Egypt fights terrorism” in reference to the 
struggle between the new government and the MB (Abdulla, 2014). In the meantime, the 
majority of private and state-owned media outlets were advocating “pro-military 
propaganda” and extreme patriotism (Webb, 2014). Songs praising the military were 
continually aired in state media outlets (El Issawi, 2014).  
Journalists, and especially foreigners, faced threats for simply carrying out their 
duties. Some were jailed, charged with terrorism or attacked by angry people due to state-
owned media propaganda (Webb, 2014). According to “Cairo Institute for Human Rights 
Studies” (CIHRS), around 39 foreign journalists and reporters faced violations, but this figure 
is under-represented because some journalists refused to give their testimony (Abdulla, 
2014). State TV also showed pictures and videos of these journalists and claimed that they 
were detained terrorists (Abdulla, 2014). 
The CIHRS report (2013) stated that 205 journalists experienced violations only 
between “June 28 and August 30, 2013.” Around 41 percent of the cases of violence were 
supposedly committed by Morsi’s supporters (a total of 85 abuses) while 20 percent were 
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supposedly committed by the military and security forces (a total of 42 abuses), and the 
others were committed by citizens opposed to the MB and to Morsi (a total of 6 abuses). 
According to the CIHRS (2013), violations committed by the MB are greatest in number but 
those committed by the state were the severest. Violations, as documented in the CIHRS 
(2013) report only, caused death of a minimum of eight people working in the media while 
six of them were only performing job tasks. The majority of the violations were committed 
during the most violent clashes such as during the Rabaa Al-Adawiya incident and 
testimonies showed that all parties wanted to cover violations committed by either pro- or 
anti- Brotherhood supporters from the public (CIHRS, 2013).  
The report finally states that around 16% of the violations targeted females working in 
the media (a total of 34) and 77% targeted males (a total of 158). The abuses against females 
were more violent than the abuses against their male counterparts. Females were harassed 
while being searched near MB sit-ins and threatened of being raped “as a form of sexual 
jihad” (CIHRS, 2013). In September 2013, thirteen journalists were still detained pending 
investigations, and 29 had been released (Abdulla, 2014). 
CIHRS accused security forces of being responsible for at least two of these deaths, 
“one in the vicinity of the National Security Guards headquarters on July 3 and the other 
when the army shot a journalist from Al-Ahram newspaper after he allegedly failed to stop 
his car at a checkpoint after the curfew on August 20” (Abdulla, 2014).   
 Laws on freedom did not relent during Mansour’s rule and in ‘Reporters Without 
Borders’, on the Freedom Index, Egypt was ranked as number 158 out of 179 countries 
mainly for “physical attacks on journalists, for trials and for lack of transparency (Harper, 
2014).” 
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II.9 The Media under President Al-Sisi’s Ruling Period  
The former head of the Egyptian military and the current President Abdel Fattah Al-
Sisi further demonstrated poor intentions in changing the state media into more democratic 
media (Abdulla, 2014). In June 2014, after he was elected, President Al-Sisi strengthened 
control over the state media and “the regime used its media control to demonize civil society 
organizations, foreign journalists, and the political opposition” (Mansour, 2015). President 
Al-Sisi’s ruling period is characterized by the silencing of those who oppose the government 
(Lindsey, 2017). The government induced polarization and used manipulations to limit free 
speech, reduced public trust in the media, and limited commercials from the media to “force 
them to self-censor” (Lindsey, 2017).    
The overall scene of Egyptian media outlets was unprofessional as most of them were 
biased in their support of the government. Radio and TV programs played nationalist songs 
and talk shows hosts and guests praised the army (Abdulla, 2014). Some talk shows launched 
campaigns against activists affiliated with the revolution and described them as “traitors,” 
“spies,” and “agents of foreign countries. Some talk show hosts further leaked private 
activists’ telephone calls that allegedly prove they are not faithful to Egypt. They were further 
framed in a way to show that activists are not loyal to Egypt. However, these conversations 
did not support the claim (Abdulla, 2014).  
 The media did not welcome voices critical to the government and “not in total 
harmony with the pro-regime propaganda.” Many independent newspapers rejected articles 
“that failed to follow that editorial  line” (Abdulla, 2014). Journalists who did not adhere to 
the propaganda were intimidated, silenced and punished (Lindsey, 2017). Those who 
reported on violations against human rights, against governmental policies or covered 
protests were considered “as disloyal enemies and were targeted for retribution” (Lindsey, 
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2017). Some media practitioners found it difficult to perform effectively in this environment 
and decided to quit, like Yousri Fouda and Reem Magued (Abdulla, 2014). Self-censorship 
also prevailed in the media and some media outlets started to support the government or 
“avoided direct criticism” which limited the divergence in opinions (Mansour, 2015). On the 
other hand, some independent media outlets tried to voice their opinions through the Internet 
which is harder for the government to control, but they were still not far from harm or from 
abuse and violations (Lindsey, 2017). The government however tried to control the Internet 
by blocking 432 websites, including Egyptian and Arab news websites, between May 24th 
and September 13th 2017 (Freedom of Thought and Expression Law Firm [AFTE], 2017).   
The Egyptian media still currently witnesses an “authoritarian media sector” and 
restrictions on “freedom of expression” (Abdulla, 2014).  It is argued that the media is an 
important tool for authoritarian governments and can help in creating consent for 
“authoritarian governments” to stay in power (Webb, 2014). Six years after the revolution 
and the limited freedom of the media is still alarming (Reporters Without Borders [RSF], 
2017). The different successive ruling governments that took power after the revolution 
restricted freedom and controlled the media (Abdulla, 2014). Currently Egypt is “one of the 
world’s biggest prisons for journalists” as some have been imprisoned for years “without 
being charged” with any violation or have not been fairly tried while others face lifelong 
imprisonment (RSF, 2017). In 2016, ‘Reporters Without Borders’ stated that Egypt is ranked 
“159th out of 180 countries” on the freedom index. It was previously ranked as 127th out of 
173 countries during Mubarak’s rule but 158th out of 178 countries in 2012 and 2013 (RSF, 
2016).   
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The media continued to be biased, and state-owned media continued to back any 
government in power while the private media was “influenced by wealthy owners with ties to 
the Mubarak government. Severe polarization between Islamist and non-Islamist media 
outlets” existed (Abdulla, 2014). Media independency from the government was further 
questioned in the “post-Brotherhood rule” for its propaganda and for its praise of the military 
by both state-owned and private media (El Issawi, 2014). “The Egyptian press is not, by any 
means, an independent Fourth Estate” despite the fact that the press showed diversity and 
occasional criticism of the changing political environment and of the governmental attempts 
to use journalists to control public opinion (Rugh, 1987).   
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Chapter III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
III.1 Hate Speech Definitions   
Hate speech can result from either suppressed hostility or from ignorance, which is 
rooted within the shortage of appropriate education (Sevasti, 2014). Ignorance “is the original 
reason that makes people susceptible to nationalism and to an authoritarian mentality and 
therefore to hate speech,” as cited in Sevasti.   
Defining hate speech is challenging as there are various definitions, as well as a 
shortage of agreement on its content (Sevasti, 2014). It is a wide general term that denotes a 
number of “negative discourses” that provoke aggression (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). Its 
meaning passes through incitement to violence, incitement to kill, to isolate others and to 
discriminate against them (Zahra, 2014). Hate speech uses dehumanization towards others in 
order to rationalize discrimination, isolation, and rejection of other groups. Dehumanization 
takes the form of attacking other individuals or groups’ dignity as well as rationalizing and 
justifying injurious actions against them (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 2016). Likewise, Matsuda 
defined hate speech as “words that wound” (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). Hate speech is mainly 
the outcome of communications that lower peoples’ equality, violates human rights and 
insults their dignity (Elliott et al., 2016). It takes different forms and can be provoked by all 
types of apparent differences (Sevasti, 2014). In the “Glossary of Hate Speech in Egyptian 
Media,” a brief general definition was used in order to help avoid hate speech, indicating that 
“criticizing individuals and groups is allowed, but without incitement to violence, 
discrimination and rejection of others” (Eissa, Elias & Kasseb, 2016).  
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Hate speech generally refers to articulations that “attack” other individuals based on 
their “race, nationality, religious identity, gender, sexual orientation or other group 
membership, where this group membership is a morally arbitrary distinguishing 
characteristic” (Yong, 2011). A similar general definition of hate speech states that it is the 
speech that arouses hostility or marginalization of individuals based on their association with 
certain groups (Elliott et al., 2016).      
Hate speech is defined by “The International Encyclopedia of Communication” as a 
“form of verbal aggression that expresses contempt, ridicule, or threat towards a specific 
group or class of people” (as cited in Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).  
Another definition by Lenkova (1998) states that hate speech is “the use of very 
precise discriminatory and selective vocabulary which tries to legitimize negative thinking 
about all those who are not “us”, those who are the “others” (as cited in Sevasti, 2014). In 
addition, Simpson (2013) defines hate speech as a term “of art in legal and political theory.” 
It indicates spoken conduct and other symbolic, communicative action, which intentionally 
conveys deep hostility targeting individuals or groups based on associating them with some 
groups commonly identified through “ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation” (Simpson, 
2013). Therefore, hate speech consists of “identity-prejudicial abuse and harassment, certain 
uses of slurs and epithets, some extremist political and religious speech such as statements to 
the effect that all Muslims are terrorists, or that homosexuals are second-class human beings 
as well as certain displays of ‘hate symbols’ such as, for example, swastikas or burning 
crosses (Simpson, 2013).  
It is important to note that slurs are not always considered hate speech, but this 
depends on the context of the uttered words. Croom (2014) questions how slurs could offend 
a large number of people while its context might differ. Some slurs such as “nigger or 
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faggot,” among others, are considered hate speech as they are usually used to belittle some 
groups based on their “racial or sexual identity” (Croom, 2013 & 2014). Slurs are also 
sometimes considered as a way of expression. Croom (2013) elaborates further through 
explaining three types of expressions: “descriptive, expressive, and slurring.” Calling 
someone an “African American” is a descriptive term that describes certain racial groups. 
Other terms like calling someone with a certain insult is considered expressive as it is 
sometimes used to express anger but, without mentioning sex or race or any other descriptive 
characteristics. On the other hand, a term like “nigger” is considered as slurring because it 
targets a member of certain groups with the intention of offending them based on their 
descriptive features (Croom, 2013).     
 Similarly, another definition of hate speech implies that it usually includes wordings 
that take any form of humiliation to any racial, “religious, ethnic, or national group” 
(Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). This wording can take place in the “form of racism, 
xenophobia, inter-ethnic hostility or intolerance as well as instigating violence, hatred or 
discrimination” (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). Homophobia, sexism, discrimination against 
gender and other types of hate were included in the concept of hate speech in the 80s of the 
last century (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014).       
Moreover, the ‘Encyclopedia of Political Communication’ defines hate speech as “the 
use of words as weapons that terrorize, humiliate, degrade, abuse, threaten, and discriminate 
others based on race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, or gender” (as 
cited in Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).  
Ring (2013) defines the word ‘hate’ separately as a connotation of undesirable 
thoughts and opinions about individuals, groups or their representatives because of their 
“race, ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation” while hate speech is all types “of 
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expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or 
other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive 
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and 
people of immigrant origin” (Ring, 2013). These definitions are based on “the Council of 
Europe’s Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime” (Ring, 2013).
 
As shown by these definitions and according to Elliott et al., (2016) hate speech 
definitions are endless and challenging, as there are controversies between classifying 
injurious speech that holds the possibility of arousing hostility and marginalizing groups or 
individuals and the speech used to participate in debatable issues. Besides, what might be 
considered as hate speech to one person might be considered as an opinion to another (Zahra, 
2014). Therefore, having a concrete definition of hate speech will provide “complex 
philosophical discussions on the meaning of belonging, freedom of expression and dignity” 
in a certain society and culture (Elliott et al., 2016). In addition, hate speech can be designed 
and influenced “by unique media landscapes in specific country contexts” especially with the 
increasing usage of social media. Consequently, investigations of hate speech depend on the 
context (Elliott et al., 2016).   
III.2 Is Hate Speech Free Speech?   
Despite the fact that hate speech is considered as a negative aspect according to its 
different definitions, there is an ongoing debate on whether hate speech should be combated 
by governments or should be considered part of the freedom of speech. The term ‘freedom of 
speech’ is used interchangeably with “freedom of the press” or “freedom of expression” 
(Elliott et al., 2016). The terminology is used within discourse communications, which are 
mostly political, and can be communicated without censorship from the state (Elliott et al., 
2016). These kinds of freedom can either be verbal, written, or can simply be ideas expressed 
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through any form including art (Elliott et al., 2016). Therefore, freedom of expression is 
transmitted through different channels such as “print, visual, broadcast, and online media” 
(Elliott et al., 2016).  
Freedom of speech is further protected by the “Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” which states in Article 19 that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” 
(United Nations [UN], ND). However, the declaration also protects individuals and groups 
against discrimination. 
The debate between hate speech and freedom of speech became obvious when some 
speech intentionally degraded individuals on the basis of belonging to certain “socio-
economic, demographic or political group” (Elliott et al., 2016). Since then, debates on 
whether to impose limitations or to encourage freedom of speech and consider hate speech a 
kind of freedom of expression have started (Elliott et al., 2016), including whether this 
speech affects people or groups’ dignity which is protected by the “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights” (Elliott et al., 2016). The Declaration stated in Article One that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (UN, ND). The UN 
further provides an explanation that dignity is hard to be positioned in a physical form, but 
the article denotes that people should “treat each other with respect, tolerance and 
understanding.”  
The argument between hate speech and freedom of expression is essentially triggered 
due to the vagueness between opinions and violations of dignity (Elliott et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the controversy on limiting hate speech is partially due to the opposing ideas 
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between the libertarian and egalitarian approaches within the arena of liberal beliefs (Brink, 
2001).  
Sikorskaya and Gafarova (2014) explain two aspects regarding hate speech 
limitations and the overlap with freedom of speech. The first aspect indicates that if 
obligatory limitations are applied to the speech content, it can harm the essential right of 
freedom of expression while the second aspect indicates that those in favor of applying 
limitations on hate speech believe that “freedom of speech is not absolute.” This claim is 
supported by Article 19 of the (ICCPR) convention. It asserted that the right of freedom of 
speech could be faced by limitations due to the speech’s “special duties and responsibilities” 
(Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014).  
Similarly, the egalitarian perspective might appear to place boundaries on freedom of 
expression (Brink, 2001). It is suggested that hate speech should be combated like other types 
of discrimination because it causes social disagreements and hostility and because it is 
offensive to its victims for its embracing discriminatory approaches with “long, ugly, and 
sometimes violent history” (Brink, 2001). As cited in Yong (2011), Schauer (1982) 
cautiously supports this opinion by saying, “under a Free Speech Principle, any governmental 
action to achieve a goal... must provide a stronger justification when the attainment of that 
goal requires the restriction of speech.” One of the situations among others that might justify 
imposing regulations on free speech is the requirement of “respect of the rights or reputations 
of others” (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). Another argument states that if hate speech is 
considered as freedom of expression, people using it will be encouraged to use it more and 
might use physical violence against groups targeted by such speech (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).  
Ianto-Petnehazi (2012) mentions Barendt’s opinion that free speech should be 
regulated to protect public peace and to protect individuals exposed to hate communication 
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from psychological harm. In addition, allowing hate speech would cause the government to 
tolerate racist groups and their attitudes. Hence, placing boundaries on freedom of speech is a 
right for the society to show their disgrace against hate speech (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).  
Likewise, Jeremy Waldron, legal philosopher, believes that for a society to function in 
an ordered way, all its members should be secured by law and should live feeling assured and 
supported by this security (Ring, 2013). Therefore, limiting hate speech will help people to 
live in a peaceful way and ethnic relations will improve (Ring, 2013).  
Conversely, a libertarian approach might appear to be limiting equality. “The cure 
might seem at least as bad as the disease,” Sevasti (2014) explains Brink’s (2001) argument 
that “offensive ideas” is a price paid for defending constitutional rights. Therefore, 
preventing and limiting “hate speech might bring equality but it would affect liberty. 
Similarly, such limitations bring up new classifications that support the notion that freedom 
of expression opposes the fundamental values of democracy (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). 
A similar argument by Cornwell and Orbe (1999) states that attempts to prevent and limit 
hate speech would lead to censorship (Sevasti, 2014).  
It is also important to note that arguments for banning hate speech might be used by 
dominating groups in a society and by some governments to prohibit speech that they do not 
like (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). This idea supports the libertarian approach and leads to the 
argument that more speech will solve the hate speech problem (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). 
Correspondingly, Brink’s argument indicates that the right way to respond to hate speech is 
having more speech and not restricting it.  
This notion is supported by the argument of a “marketplace of ideas” that is proposed 
by John Stuart Mill (Ring, 2013). This is similar to the “open market” idea and argues that 
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opinions and views should not be rejected and should be debated to avoid governmental 
limitations (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). This argument is mainly directed against censorship and 
states that it is better to know the ideas instead of muting them (Ring, 2013). Besides, 
censorship would restrict finding the truth and limit the marketplace of ideas (Ring, 2013). 
Some scholars argue that truth would be more vivid when it clashes with error (Ring, 2013). 
Truth is, further, the basic element for social and political developments according to the 
legal scholar Zachariah Chafee (Ring, 2013). In addition, limiting hate speech might 
intimidate some people from speaking about “sensitive” issues like “racial differences in 
response to medical treatments” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2009). 
Oliver Wendell Holmes believes that the best ideas among “favorable and 
unfavorable” ones will arise when both types of ideas compete (Ring, 2013). According to 
Ring (2013), Chafee and Holmes believe that when the best ideas arise they will instantly be 
accepted and used to lead the “favorable” development of the society.   
However, Brison criticizes the marketplace model and argues that assuming that 
“good ideas” in a society will arise and will demonstrate the irrationality of hate speech is not 
possible (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). C. Edwin Baker supports Brison, as people do not have 
equal access to the marketplace and therefore the ideas of people with more limited access to 
the media will not be widely disseminated, accepted and acknowledged (Ring, 2013). 
Because “bad ideas” are mainly directed towards minorities, then there will be a shortage in 
“good ideas” (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). In addition, hate speech can silence women and 
minorities who are targeted by such speech, and therefore might restrict speech for certain 
groups. Consequently, it is important to prevent hate speech to create space for public debates 
where everyone’s voice can be heard without fear (Ring, 2013). Delgado and Stefancic also 
argue that the “marketplace of ideas” leads to marginalizing minorities who are already weak 
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and do not have access to the media and it mainly benefits the majority, as their ideas will 
dominate the market (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). This means that the marketplace of ideas will 
not succeed until individuals and groups have equal access to mainstream media and different 
opinions get the chance to be represented (Ring, 2013).    
As freedom of speech takes different forms, either political, artistic or symbolic and is 
disseminated through different channels, laws and regulations are not sufficient to fight hate 
speech (Zahra, 2014). Some scholars such as Alexander Meiklejohn and Owen Fiss believe in 
self-governance rather than regulations and believe in absolute freedom (Ring, 2013). 
Similarly, Baker believes that freedom of speech including hate speech is important in order 
to achieve “self-fulfillment” and to guarantee that everyone in the society is contributing to 
the change (Ring, 2013). Likewise, Delgado (1987) believes that laws might only discourage 
some people from using hate speech, but will not necessarily limit it.    
Others argue that protecting hate speech acts like a “bellwether for racism” which 
suggests that if hate speech is prevented then people will not be aware that racist and negative 
opinions exist and will assume that no racism exists while it is only hidden (Ring, 2013).   
There are different suggestions to combat hate speech while avoiding governmental 
limitations that might harm freedom of speech and impose censorship. According to 
Sikorskaya and Gafarova (2014), most of the experts believe that hate speech must be 
encountered by another kind of speech that aims both to inform the audience and eliminate 
deception and bias and to “overcome the enemy image and destroy stereotypes, thus 
changing public opinion voluntarily” (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014).  
 Zahra (2014) suggests creating media civil society associations that aim to expose 
media outlets and individuals adopting hate speech, by using strict scientific methods and 
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then publishing and disseminating their results to the people. He adds that it is important to 
raise awareness on human rights and considers it as an educational topic to be taught in 
schools. This suggestion is supported by Lenkova who explained that hate speech is the result 
of ignorance rooted in the lack of an appropriate education.  
Media practitioners should also learn about human rights and should receive training 
on how to differentiate between freedom of speech and hate speech, which will help them to 
avoid the usage of hate language (Zahra, 2014). According to Zahra (2014), the media has a 
role to play in order to combat this phenomenon by providing time and space to encourage 
cultural debates and the acceptance of others opinions. Additionally, the media should have 
clear standards on its messages to avoid hate speech (Zahra, 2014).      
While these debates are ongoing, in accordance with the presence of a challenge on 
limiting hate speech since it might mean applying limitations on free speech (Ianto-Petnehazi, 
2012) the fact is that there are more leaning towards preventing and combating hate speech 
and therefore placing boundaries on freedom of expression (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). 
Limitations on hate speech might be motivated by social disapprovals or legal sanctions 
(Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014). However, some “international initiatives” were established 
to find solutions for expressions that may provoke hate in the media (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 
2014). The criteria for limitations differ from one country to another regarding the forms of 
expressions, prohibitions and punishments (Sikorskaya & Gafarova, 2014).  
III.3 US. and European Regulations    
The preceding debate continues even within the constitution and the legislations on 
speech in different constitutions. It is important to examine the American constitution and 
laws and comprehend their relationship to freedom of expression and hate speech, as 
America is known to be the “land of freedom.” Besides, most of the literature on hate speech 
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is derived from the American perspective and therefore, all inquiries on the limitations of 
hate speech concern the American constitution (Simpson, 2013). A brief overview on 
freedom of expression and hate speech in European countries is presented and discussed as it 
is generally argued that European countries respect freedom more than their Middle Eastern 
and especially their Egyptian counterparts.  
Hate speech presents a number of difficulties in the current constitutional “rights to 
freedom of expression” (Rosenfeld, 2003). Similar to the argument for imposing limitations 
on hate speech and its effects on freedom of expression, some disagreements arise within the 
American constitution.  
On the one hand, some believe in the strict primacy of protecting free speech 
according to the First Amendment (Simpson, 2013) which is part of “the Bill of Rights” and 
which states that “Congress shall make no law regarding an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the 
right of the people to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” 
(United States, 1990). Therefore, hate speech is highly protected by the US. constitution 
(Rosenfeld, 2003) to the extent of considering “extreme racist speech” as well as burning 
crosses (Bleich, 2014) as free speech, as shown by various decisions by the Supreme Court 
(Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). According to this, there are no convictions for racist expressions 
unless the wording inflames instant violence or forms a direct threat (Bleich, 2014). Such 
harm is decided by the “legal community” depending on the average person’s standards and 
values and each case is looked at separately (Leets & Giles, 1997). Other exceptions made by 
the court also include cases when hate speech generates a hazard of illegal action, when it 
consists of fighting words, when it is explicit, and includes defamation, false information or 
misleading advertisements, and “the government can demonstrate compelling interest” (Leets 
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& Giles, 1997). However, all these exceptions might not be applicable and are restricted as 
they could be considered vague or could fall under the Overbreadth Doctrine (Leets & Giles, 
1997). 
On the other hand, the argument for absolute freedom is criticized as the demands of 
the “First Amendment’s must be balanced against the socially egalitarian aspirations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (Simpson, 2013). This Amendment is against discrimination and 
favors preventing any ethnic inequality, as it stipulates that no state shall “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (as cited in Ring, 2013). However, it is 
important to note that despite the fact that hate speech is protected by the first amendment, 
each hate speech case is dealt with separately through a court decision (Ring, 2013). 
Despite many arguments, freedom of speech in the US. is generally a persistent right 
more than in other constitutional democracies (Rosenfeld, 2003). The strong preference of 
the libertarian approach over the egalitarian approach is among the reasons that prioritize free 
speech in the US. (Rosenfeld, 2003). Furthermore, when comparing the US. constitution with 
that of other European countries, some disparities become clear (Rosenfeld, 2003), as both 
systems have established different approaches to control hate speech. In the 1960s, the USA 
started to place more protection towards hate speech while European countries started to 
penalize it (Bleich, 2014).  
The line between freedom of expression and hate speech is mainly decided by high 
courts in the USA and Europe. Since human rights laws do not consider freedom of speech as 
an absolute right, this freedom can be limited by different international protocols (Elliott et 
al., 2016) which include “the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR), 
the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the European Convention for 
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Human Rights (ECHR)” (Elliott et al., 2016). However, those focusing on discrimination 
abide by Article 20(2) of the ICPPR which states: “Any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law” (as cited in Elliott et al., 2016). More articles that aim to fight 
discrimination are included in the “the International Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination” document (Elliott et al., 2016).   
“The European Court of Human Rights” was created to impose “the 1949 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)” (Bleich, 2014). Since the 1960s, the ECHR has 
imposed major rulings on free speech. Also, due to the expansion of the Council of Europe’ 
membership, the power that the court holds in making judicial decisions on freedom of 
expression on the national level now covers almost the whole continent (Bleich, 2014). 
Unlike the protection allowed to hate speech in the US. constitution, “modest legal 
restrictions on hate speech are well-established’ in European states “and are not as vigorously 
contested as in the US” (Simpson, 2013). Hate speech is generally protected in the USA with 
only some exceptions and is prohibited in Europe. In addition, in Europe, freedom of speech 
is balanced against other rights and protections (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). Provoking racial 
hatred is considered as a threat and might be criminalized according to most of the European 
jurisdictions, to the extent that if a book inquired about the existence of the holocaust it will 
be considered hate speech (Bleich, 2014). For example, Germany fights and restricts any 
speech that denies the Holocaust and this blurs the line between opinion and fact and raises 
concerns over the limitations on academic freedom (Rosenfeld, 2003). Within these 
restrictions of hate speech, the European jurisdiction is still considered as highly respectful of 
freedom of expression (Bleich, 2014). 
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Both US and Europe are also currently trying to fight online hate messages and 
pressured social media platforms to fight “extremist content”; therefore, social media 
platforms were removing 99 percent of content associated with extremist militant groups 
(Fioretti, 2017). There are trials by the European Commission to combat online hate speech, 
through the “Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online” (European 
Commission, 2017). The union agreed with the IT companies “Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter 
and YouTube” to fight online hate speech by removing it.  
The European Commission defined Illegal hate speech as “combating certain forms 
and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law and national laws 
transposing it, means all conduct publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a 
group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, 
descent or national or ethnic origin” (European Commission, 2017). While trying to fight 
hate speech the European Commission and the IT Companies reinforced protecting freedom 
of expression. The code of conduct is a way that “help users notifying illegal hate speech” in 
the social platforms, the IT companies review the notification and assess hate speech then 
they remove or disable access to the illegal hate content within 24 hours. IT companies will 
also raise awareness and inform social platform users on the prohibited content (European 
Commission, 2017).  
Unlike the American constitution, the Canadian constitution applies restrictions on 
speech, in order to protect youngsters and individuals’ personal dignity, especially because 
Canada is a multicultural country (Rosenfeld, 2003). The Canadian approach further focuses 
on the consequences of threats that might be implemented from hate speech in the long term 
and not only those threats made during moments of instant violence (Rosenfeld, 2003). 
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Germany limits hate speech through enforcing different legal systems, including civil 
and criminal laws to protect against slur, libel and oral offenses such as “attacks against a 
person's honor or integrity, damage to reputation, and disparaging the memory of the dead” 
(Rosenfeld, 2003). The German “Basic Law” also balances between freedom of speech and 
dignity. The constitution creates equality between the duties and rights of citizens on one side 
and those of the government on the other side (Rosenfeld, 2003).  
“Criminal liability” in the German law is considered to refer to “incitement to hatred, 
or attacks on human dignity against individuals or groups determined by nationality, race, 
religion, or ethnic origin” (Rosenfeld, 2003).  
The UK is different as it does not have a constitution but it acknowledges freedom of 
expression through its devotion to “international covenants, such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and through commitment to constitutional values inherent in its” tradition 
of the rule of law (Rosenfeld, 2003). Besides, the UK has outlawed hate speech since the 17th 
century (Rosenfeld, 2003). Its freedom of speech regulations has changed over time starting 
with “reinforcing the security of the government and ending with protecting targets against 
racially motivated harassment” (Rosenfeld, 2003). 
Rosenfeld (2003) cites some examples of hate speech and concludes that as hate 
speech is not similar in general, its consequences and relevant court decisions also differ 
depending on the situation. Furthermore, the effects of hate speech differ according to the 
medium it was communicated through. For example, verbal communication directed to a 
small audience will not be the same as messages posted on the Internet and disseminated to a 
worldwide audience adding that non-immediate harms yielded by hate speech are difficult to 
measure (Rosenfeld, 2003). One of the reasons for such difficulty is that the connotations and 
the extent of harm of the messages vary from one listener to another and according to the 
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context itself (Leets & Giles, 1997). In addition, emotional and psychological harm are hard 
to measure (Leets & Giles, 1997).     
While there are disparities between the US and other Western countries’ approaches 
towards hate speech, each approach implemented by those countries has advantages and 
disadvantages (Rosenfeld, 2003).   
For example, the major benefit of the approach implemented by the US. is having a 
clear line between legitimate and illegitimate speech while the major disadvantage is that it is 
not tailored to deal with harms that might result from hate speech in the long term 
(Rosenfeld, 2003). Also, the approach used by the US. does not pay attention to the harmful 
effects of hate speech on its victims’ dignity and the attitudes and beliefs people might 
embrace from such speech (Rosenfeld, 2003).   
III.4 Hate Speech and International Treaties  
 Freedom of expression is an important asset that is protected by the “major 
international covenants of human rights”  such as the 1984 U.N. “Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,” the 1966 “United Nations Covenant on Civil Right and Political Rights” 
(CCPR), and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),”  all embraced after 
the second World War (Rosenfeld, 2003).   
However, these covenants place some boundaries on freedom of speech in order to 
combat hate speech like the CCPR (Rosenfeld, 2003). Article 19 of the CCPR stresses on 
freedom of speech but still places restrictions to be reinforced by law for the “respect of the 
rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or for public order, or 
for public health or morals” (United Nations [UN], ND).   
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In Article 20, the covenant states that “any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by 
law and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law” (UN, ND). 
In addition, Article 26 states that the law should forbid discrimination and ensure 
equality “and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status” (UN, ND). 
Moreover, “Article 4 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) condemns all types of discrimination and declares 
discrimination to be punishable by laws (UN, ND).  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses on the freedom of expression 
and further states in Article 7 that all people “are equal before the law and are entitled to 
equal protection of the law without any discrimination.” All are entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination” (UN, ND).  Another protection to people against hate speech is in Article 29 
of the Declaration which states that individuals’ rights and freedom can be subject to 
limitations by law for the reason of safeguarding and respecting others’ freedom and rights 
and to meet the impartial requirements “of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”  
The ECHR highly protects people’s freedom and includes different aspects of this 
freedom such as freedom of thought and religion, freedom of expression and peaceful 
assembly and so on in Articles 9, 10, and 11. However, similar to the ICCPR, it places some 
boundaries within this freedom by stating, in part two of Article 10:  
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The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in condense, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (ECHR, ND).  
Article 14 further clearly states that practicing freedom should be applied without any 
practice of discrimination. The Article states that  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. (ECHR, ND).   
III.5 Freedom of Speech and Laws Combating Hate Speech in Egypt 
 Similar to the American constitution, the Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 
2014 guarantees freedom of expression in Article 65. Besides, Article 67 also protects this 
freedom and indicates that “no lawsuit may be initiated or filed to stop or confiscate any 
artistic, literary, or intellectual works, or against their creators except by the Public 
Prosecutor.  No freedom- restricting sanction may be inflicted for crimes committed because 
of the publicity of artistic, literary or intellectual product.” However, the Article imposes 
more limitations and states that “for crimes related to the incitement to violence, 
discrimination between citizens, or impingement of individual honor, the Law shall specify 
the penalties” (State Information Service, ND). This article might be used as a tool against 
hate speech as it includes discrimination, incitement to violence, infringing others’ honor, but 
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it is general and could be abused to limit freedom of expression by the government.   
 In addition, guaranteeing media freedom in the constitution does not mean that such 
freedom is practiced. The government of Egypt uses laws such as “emergency laws and 
articles from the penal code” to hinder freedom of expression and censor media content, 
which gradually caused self-censorship and created “redlines” on sensitive topics (Abdulla, 
2014).  
There are generally no specific laws against hate speech in Egypt (Elliott et al., 2016). 
However, Article 51 of the constitution indicates that “dignity is the right of every human 
being and may not be violated. The State shall respect and protect human dignity.” It also 
focuses in Article 53 on equality between citizens with no discrimination between them. It 
also states that “discrimination and incitement to hatred is a crime punished by Law” (State 
Information Service, ND).   
Besides the constitution, the “Press Charter of Honor” of journalists issued by the 
“Egyptian Supreme Council of Press” in 1998 declares in its general principles that 
journalists should respect the dignity of other people as well as women and minorities’ rights. 
It also asserts that journalists are professionally obliged not to call for discrimination, 
extremism, nor incite to hate religions, nor call for discrimination, nor for belittling any sect 
of the society. The same is further stated in Article 20 in the press law (Supreme Council of 
the Press, ND).   
Despite the absence of laws against hate speech, there are other laws against certain 
acts such as “religious blasphemy” which “is an offence under the Penal Code.”  However, 
since this law “protects Judaism, Christianity, and Islam” only (Elliott et al., 2016), it is 
criticized for being discriminatory itself as it ignores protecting other beliefs such as Shia, 
Baha’ism, Atheism and so on (Ezzat, 2014).  It is also argued that it is discriminatory against 
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Christianity and Judaism too because, in practical terms, only Islam is protected against slurs 
or criticism, unlike what its text implies (Elliott et al., 2016).  
While some believe that extreme religious criticism is free speech as long as it does 
not incite to violence against a group of people, others believe that it might cause hate and 
hostility on religious bases (Ezzat, 2014). Anyhow, this law is considered to be limiting 
freedom of expression and speech, opposing international conventions and failing to protect 
minorities and marginalized groups (Elliott et al., 2016; Ezzat, 2014).   
According to the penal code, “Hate speech may sometimes be prosecuted if it 
includes incitements to commit a crime,” but offences must take place or it will not be 
penalized (Elliott et al., 2016). Besides, the Penal code definition to incitement is too broad, it 
can include incitement for murder, for toppling the regime, for disobedience of orders by 
soldiers, for discrimination and for violating laws. However, according to the penal code 
these incitements are not penalized because they do not include offences (Elliott et al., 2016). 
In addition, this Penal code can be used to limit freedom of speech due to its broad definition 
(Elliott et al., 2016). 
 Due to the absence of a concrete definition of hate speech, Egyptian laws are used to 
restrict freedom of expression and not to limit hate speech (Elliott et al., 2016).   
 However, recently there are some attempts in Egypt by Al-Azhar “the world’s oldest 
Sunni institute of Islamic learning” to criminalize hate speech, focusing on hate speech 
against religious beliefs (Ahram online, 2017). Al-Azhar drafted a law named “combating 
hate and violence conducted in the name of religion” and it consists of 16 articles. The 
following paragraphs is an overview of the draft law and some of its articles, and it is not 
literal translation of the draft law’s Arabic version, but mostly an overview and explanations 
of it.  
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As the drafted law is new there is shortage of literature discussing it. However, it is 
criticized by Ezzat (2017) for leaning towards limiting freedom of belief and freedom of 
expression and is more into controlling religious speech and is scattered away from 
combating hate speech, incitement to discrimination and violence. The law defines the term 
“Religion” as Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Al-Azhar, 2017). Therefore, the draft law is 
criticized for excluding other beliefs (Ezzat, 2017). “Dr. Ashour Abdelrahman, a professor at 
the Sharia and Law College of Al-Azhar University in Tanta and a member of the committee 
who worked on the draft” said in an interview with Egypt Today that “This is a 
misunderstanding of the law…preventing hate speech towards religions and believers of 
these religions who constitute about 95 percent of Egyptian society does not mean that we 
allow hate speech towards others” (as cited in Ismail, 2017). But, this however is still not 
clarified in the draft law itself.  
The draft law defines hate speech in Article one, that it is any statement, attitude, or 
public conduct that incites for violence or motivates social strife (Al-Azhar, 2017). This 
Article is criticized by Ezzat (2017) for being too broad.  
The law defines discrimination as any differentiation between individuals or groups 
based on religion, belief, faith, sect, ethnicity or color (Al-Azhar, 2017). One of the draft 
law’s different aims is to gain equality by law, to protect freedom of belief and accept “the 
other.” According to the proposed law Articles it also protects against mocking others’ 
beliefs or Holy Books, God and prophets (Al-Azhar, 2017). 
The draft law assures in Article three that it does not conflict with the fact of the 
existence of the differences between religions, and it does not conflict with the freedom of 
scientifically researching in religions. This however contradicts with Article six (Ezzat, 
2017). Which states that the law prevents discussing debatable creeds publicly in the media in 
 51 
a way that might inflame violence between those creeds believers (Al-Azhar, 2017). 
Abdelrahman, states that “criticizing such books is not prohibited as long as it is presented in 
a reasonable and respectful way that does not provoke intolerance or hatred” (as cited in 
Ismail, 2017). However, Article six shows that violence among creeds believers is an 
inevitable effect or at least predictable if debatable religious issues are discussed and the 
wording “might inflame violence” does not include incitement to violence or calling for 
discrimination, which is considered shortage in how the Article is phrased (Ezzat, 2017).  
The draft law also prohibits in Article eight publishing or re-publishing news, photos, 
interviews, in any audiovisual or print media that might incite for hatred, increases it, 
reinforces it or strengthen it. This Article is criticized by Ezzat (2017), for being too broad 
especially the term “might incite for hatred” which might lead to violations against religious 
freedom of expression.  
In Article nine the draft law also prohibits any conduct that might discriminate against 
people living in the society or disseminate discriminative ideas (Al-Azhar, 2017).  
Ezzat (2017), criticize the draft for repeating some Articles that is already used in the 
Penal Code. For example, Article seven prohibits disdaining or inciting to disdaining God or 
the prophets through any media outlet and forbid disrespecting or attacking any religious 
scriptures by changing, damaging or defiling them. This is a replication of the blasphemy 
Article 98 in the Penal Code and Articles 160 and 161 that are related to attacking religious 
scriptures by changing, damaging or defiling them. Article seven further has negative 
implication, according to Ezzat (2017), as the blasphemy law was used to restrict ideas that 
criticize the majority of Sunni Islam.   
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Finally, the draft law states in Article four that freedom of expression, media freedom, 
freedom to criticize, publication and creativity should not be taken as a pretext to contradict 
with the law Articles (Al-Azhar, 2017).  
III.6 Hate Speech in the Media 
 
Hate speech is present in different countries within the different media used.  For 
example, “the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)” in Vienna 
conducted a “comparative research on media and racism” (Hafez, 2011). The results showed 
that the portrayal of foreigners and migrants is distorted.  Hafez (2011) explained that despite 
living in a globalized world, this did not positively affect the way Muslims and Islam are 
viewed stereotypically in the west.  
 As mentioned before by Ezzat (2014), religion and hate speech are among the 
debatable issues as it is argued whether “hate speech against religious groups or criticism 
against religion” is hate speech or not. However, this differs according to the culture and the 
country. For instance, the sarcastic Islamic cartoons published in the Charlie Hebdo French 
magazine are considered by the Al-Ahram state-owned Egyptian newspaper as disrespectful 
of religion and abusive of freedom of speech (Elliott et al., 2016). Different articles in Al-
Ahram suggested that the attacks on Charlie Hebdo’s office in Paris in January 2015 were a 
consequence of the cartoons and the failure to restrict the insults (Elliott et al., 2016). The 
attacks caused the death of 11 persons and injured 12 people (Pen International Organization, 
2016).  Some people blamed the Hebdo for the violence, as someone stated that the reaction 
was predictable, since Muslims were offended (Ali, ND). According to this opinion, 
criticizing religion can create hate speech (Elliott et al., 2016).  Other opinions voiced by 
Muslims condemned the violent attacks (Ali, ND). On the other hand, some Western nations 
believe that Hebdo’s cartoon was a way of expressing opinions and therefore, was really 
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freedom of speech (Elliott et al., 2016). “Pen International Organization” (2016) assured their 
support for the freedom of expression even if it is offensive to others.  
 In the Arab world, incitement, accusations and slurs are practiced by biased media 
outlets and these affected many Arab countries negatively after the Arab Spring (Zahra, 
2014). Similarly, hate speech was used in the Egyptian media after the 25th of January 
revolution (Elliott et al., 2016). One of the reasons for using it is the competition to win 
among political parties and their belief that winning can only be achieved through getting rid 
of ‘the other,’ which leads to creating clusters on the political and social levels (Zahra, 2014). 
The Egyptian media practiced clear incitement that increased conflict and led to the creation 
of violence and terrorism (Zahra, 2014). The types of hate speech forms included “political, 
xenophobic, religious and cultural forms” (Elliott et al., 2016).  
Political hate speech was used against activists and members of the opposition during 
the ruling period of Mubarak, the SCAF, MB (El-Sherif, 2014), as well as during that of 
President Al-Sisi. It was, and still is, mainly directed against political groups and Egyptian 
oppositional figures due to their political views (Elliott et al., 2016). The growth of political 
hate speech in the Egyptian media was due to different factors including the chaotic way 
opinions were expressed after the 25th of January revolution and the unprofessional and the 
unethical standards adopted by the media (Elliott et al., 2016). Another factor was media 
politicization which resulted from the dependence of the media on private ownership (Elliott 
et al., 2016). During the last days of Morsi’s rule and after the June 30, 2013 protests, media 
polarization also increased (Elliott et al., 2016). At this stage, “conspiracy theories” and 
broad claims targeted different political groups and were disseminated through the media 
(Elliott et al., 2016).  
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Some of the MB leaders used hate speech but they did not clearly incite to violence, 
yet the way they used discriminatory hate speech was clear (El-Sherif, 2014). During a 
conference held at the Cairo stadium, and that was aired on TV when Morsi was the 
President, one of his Islamist supporters clearly called Morsi’s opponents as ‘infidels’ while 
Morsi remained silent (El-Sherif, 2014). This incident, according to El-Sherif (2014), was the 
trigger that encouraged extremists among his followers to disseminate hate and sectarian 
messages.   
Similarly, hate speech was practiced after the isolation of Morsi according to the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The media in Egypt reflected the huge division 
among Egyptians and supported hatred against Islamists (Zahra, 2014). Reuters asserted that 
this state of hate was supported by the failure of Morsi’s ruling period and the way MB was 
trying to take over authority (Zahra, 2014). As the government was later about to ban the 
Muslim Brotherhood, it portrayed them in the media as a terrorist group and footage was 
played as evidence to support this (Miles, 2013). In addition, there was a campaign on both 
state-owned and private TV full of negative messages targeting MB supporters through 
rejecting them from the society and portraying them as “evil, anti-Islamic and anti-national” 
(El-Issawi, 2014). Songs were played in the media glorifying the army (El-Issawi, 2014). One 
common song aired on TV titled “We Are a People; they Are Another,” implied that MB 
members and their supporters were “the Other” (Abdullah, 2014). Another video clip, 
produced by the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior and its song written by an army general, 
showed people shooting guns and saying “not from our country and not our children”3 and 
                                                 
3 Check “not from our country” song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFb21-P6XT4 
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“he who does not feel happy for our happiness and sorrow for our sourness is not one of us” 
which excludes MB members (El-Issawi, 2014) and all opposition in general.  
 Another type of political hate speech was practiced by a former prime minister on a 
satellite TV live program on January 28, 2016, as he expressed support for the mass killing of 
opposition groups. (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2016). The program host, Ahmed Moussa, 
was discussing how the army made sacrifices and was fighting terrorism, and the minister 
was quoted by HRW (2016) as saying, “I swear that we will only be satisfied to have 400,000 
for their sake… I swear by God Almighty that, personally, the fire in my heart will not be 
extinguished unless, for each one, there’s at least 10,000.” By this, he was indicating that he 
wished that, for every soldier killed, another 10,000 persons will die too. Moussa asked if the 
Minister meant all the MB members by this large figure and the latter firmly replied “I’m 
saying the Brotherhood and whoever helps them and whoever loves them and whoever 
pleases them and whoever takes bribes from them and whoever lives off their ill-gotten funds 
from Turkey and Qatar and Iran” (HRW, 2016).  
Similar to political hate messages is nationalist hate speech that targets nationalists 
from Arab countries because of their views on Egyptian politics and who they are loyal to; 
this speech includes “conspiracy theories” describing people as “enemies of the nation” 
(Elliott et al., 2016).  
The Egyptian media played a major role in creating a hostile environment against 
Palestinian and Syrian refugees living in Egypt (Zahra, 2014) as both groups were the target 
of threats and verbal attacks (Amnesty, 2013). The media helped in showing them as “thugs, 
beggars, greedy people” among other negative characteristics (Zahra, 2014).  
 56 
Hate speech against Palestinians was mainly an accusation for their having a 
relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood (Elliott et al., 2016; Amnesty, 2013) and the 
Hamas movement (Elliott et al., 2016). Morsi was accused of having cooperated with Hamas 
to help him escape from jail during the January 25th revolution protests. Hamas was also 
accused by the media of shooting protesters on June 30 near the MB headquarters (Knell, 
2013).  Palestinians were further associated with the disturbance in North Sinai as “militant 
groups” in North Sinai were allegedly associated with Hamas (Amnesty, 2013). The speech 
was mainly targeting Palestinians after Morsi’s ousting (Zahra, 2014) and most refugees told 
Amnesty (2013) that their situation got worse after they were the target of hate speech.       
 Hate speech against Syrians increased in July and August 2013 then decreased again 
(Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). After the June 30, 2013 protests, a “few Syrians” joined pro-Morsi 
sit-ins. This was highlighted in the media and therefore caused a hostile attitude against them 
(Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). Syrians were accused of “carrying weapons, and of attacking 
civilians and security officials” (Amnesty, 2013). State and private TV spread the rumor that 
they were paid by the MB to shoot soldiers and anti-Morsi protesters (Sailer, 2013). Some 
TV anchors accused them of backing the MB and “interfering in Egypt’s internal politics” 
(Ayoub & Shaden, 2014; Amnesty 2013), while others threatened Syrians in case they 
interfered in Egyptian politics (Elliott et al., 2016). “If you interfere in Egyptian affairs, you 
will take 30 shoes [be beaten up] in the middle of the street,” said a well- known anchor 
(Amnesty, 2013) while another one stated in his program that Egyptians know where Syrians 
live and threatened to have their houses destroyed if they did not end their support to MB 
within two days (HRW, 2013; Amnesty, 2013). In addition, a former Egyptian parliament 
member asked to execute foreigners who participate in any protest in Egypt (Elliott et al., 
2016). This increased the environment of mistrust and fear of Syrians (HRW, 2013).  
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Some Egyptians perceived Syrians as “enemies of the state” due to such statements in 
the media (Sailer, 2013). Some Syrians were physically attacked. In one such incident, a man 
was stabbed in the bus for only asking people to stop smoking and the stabber accused him of 
being a member of the MB (Mousa & Fahim, 2013).  After June 30, 2013, Ayoub & Shaden 
(2014) conducted interviews with Syrians and organizations supporting them, and all 
confirmed that Syrians faced a hostile attitude.  Some even said that they were dismissed 
from their work “while others had their rent contracts terminated” right after the June 30 
protests (Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). Similarly, interviews with Amnesty (2013) confirmed that 
Syrians did not feel safe anymore. Also, after hate speech was used, some Syrian children 
experienced violence from their Egyptian counterparts (Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). These 
incidents contradicted the way Egyptians welcomed Syrians in 2011 and hosted them in their 
households until they found appropriate housing (Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). “Refugees told 
Amnesty International that they felt safe and protected” during this period (Amnesty, 2013). 
Changes in people’s attitudes towards Syrians show how the media can easily affect people’s 
behavior (Ayoub & Shaden, 2014). After the media attacks, many Palestinians and Syrians 
tried to smuggle their way out to Italy by sea (Amnesty, 2013).  
Xenophobic hate speech also was used since the 25th of January revolution and part of 
the reason for practicing it was to claim that both the revolution and all democratic ideas are 
western-made (Elliott et al., 2016). For example, in TV program, an Egyptian actress said 
that all those in Tahrir square were from London, but they speak like Egyptians and their 
descriptive features, like skin color, are similar to those of Egyptians. She added that they 
were trained to take soldiers out of tanks and drive the tanks “because there is a war coming” 
(Bassiouney, 2012). Her words bring to mind the pre-colonization period. The actress was 
speaking in Arabic except when she said that a man was given a paper to write on it “no 
Mubarak.”  She only said ‘no Mubarak’ in English to show that anyone working against 
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Mubarak or anyone with bad intentions was a foreigner or was working with foreign powers 
(Bassiouney, 2012).  
After the ousting of Morsi, xenophobic speech continued. During the summer of 
2013, negative responses against the US. and especially against Anne Patterson, the US 
ambassador to Egypt at the time, increased as Americans were blamed by many Egyptians for 
“trying to weaken” Egypt since some in Washington had criticized the ousting of Morsi 
(Daragahi, 2013). “Conspiracy theories” about foreign plans for weakening Egypt further 
started to spread in the media (Daragahi, 2013). An Egyptian TV commercial was 
xenophobic as it warned Egyptians about giving information to foreigners since these can 
possibly be spies (Elliott et al., 2016). Therefore, xenophobic hate speech can instigate hate 
or rejection of foreigners and more especially westerners (Elliott et al., 2016).  
Polarization in the media leads to hate speech against religious groups too, especially 
Christians, and this has led to different attacks against them after the isolation of Morsi, with 
other religious minorities also being the target of hate speech (Elliott et al., 2016).  There is 
further unfairness in Egypt on how religious hate speech is dealt with. Blasphemy against 
Islam, for example, leads to disorder that is “addressed” by the government while on the 
other hand, hate speech against other religions is rarely criticized (Elliott et al., 2016). In 
addition, the state media, especially the “Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU)”, 
used hate speech while covering the protests on Mohamed Mahmoud Street and in Maspero 
(Zahra, 2014). In Maspero, the state TV paid no attention to the attack on protesters, who 
were mostly Egyptian Christians, outside its own building, nor to the running over and 
crushing most of them by army trucks (Abdulla, 2014). While it ignored these facts, the TV 
Channel claimed that protesters were attacking the army and throwing “rocks and Molotov 
cocktails on them, killing three and injuring 30 soldiers. The state TV clearly asked those 
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called “the good Samaritans of Egypt” to help the army against the protesters, but no one was 
punished in this incident (Abdulla, 2014). “This was not incitement to violence. The 
presenter was politically emotional. We admit this is a mistake.” The incident was 
investigated and “the presenter is back to work now”, said Ibrahim Sayyad, the then head of 
the News Department (as cited in El Issawi, 2014). On the other hand, four Christian 
teenagers were sentenced to prison for appearing in a video circulated on the Internet as they 
were laughing while reading Koranic verses and moving their hands over their friend’s neck 
imitating the so-called “Islamic group of Iraq and Sham (ISIS).” The teenagers said they were 
just mocking ISIS but they were judged for contempt of Islam (Raghavan, 2016).  
Some private channels, like those affiliated with Islamist groups, used hate speech 
against Shia religious groups (Elliott et al., 2016; Africa Research Bulletin, 2013). After 
residents learned about the presence of the leading Shiite cleric “Hassan Shehata” as he was 
meeting with other Shiites in a house in the Abu Mussalam area, they surrounded the house 
requesting them to get out (Africa Research Bulletin, 2013).  Upon their refusal, the house 
was attacked by “several hundred people” which led to the killing of four Shiites and injuring 
others, as police reported (Africa Research Bulletin, 2013). Bahaa Anwar, a Shiite activist 
said “…. during the Syria solidarity conference attended by Morsi in the Cairo Stadium, 
Salafist sheikhs insulted Shiites and provoked hate against those Egyptian Shiite citizens” 
while Morsi did not condemn the offences nor the incitements (El Gundy, 2013). “An 
Egyptian court sentenced 23 people to 14 years in prison for the fatal lynching of four Shiite 
men…and acquitted eight other defendants” (HRW, 2013). 
Another type of hate speech is directed against ethnic groups and members of certain 
communities such as the “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community” 
(Elliott et al., 2016). The LGBT community in Egypt was blamed for “many social ills, as 
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well as for the spread of diseases such as HIV” (Elliott et al., 2016). In one controversial 
incident, the police raided a bathhouse after a TV anchor told them that a few homosexual 
men were performing sexual activity in exchange for money (BBC, 2015). The program 
published footage of a group of men wearing only their sauna towels while being pushed into 
police trucks (Trew, 2015). The court acquitted the men of the “debauchery” accusation 
(BBC, 2015). However, many of them lost their occupations and one of them, according to 
his lawyer, set himself on fire as a result of the humiliation he was exposed to and his being 
labeled as gay, which is unacceptable in the Egyptian society. (Trew, 2015).  The TV host 
later said that the aim of the program was to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS (Trew, 2015; BBC 
2015); despite the fact that almost half of all detected HIV cases in Egypt occur through 
heterosexual transmission” (Trew, 2015). The host and the program director were charged 
with defamation (Trew, 2015). “Pro-government news outlets are often invited by security 
forces to cover this kind of raid” and reporters usually interview suspects on the spot and 
reveal their identity which damages their reputation and even their lives (Trew, 2015). This is 
particularly true because the LGBT community is rejected by most people (Elliott et al., 
2016), especially in a conservative country like Egypt.  
 Research conducted by “MENA Media Monitoring” (2015) investigated hate speech 
in the press of different countries in the Arab region. In Egypt, the research focused on a 
period of three weeks from June 5 to 26, 2014 and examined Al-Dustour, Al-Watan and Al-
Masry Al-Youm private daily newspapers in addition to the state-owned daily newspapers, 
Al-Gomhouria and Rose-Al-Youssef. They further examined the weekly private newspapers, 
Al-Isboa, Sawt-Aloma and Alfagr.  
Hate speech found in Al-Dustour newspaper constituted 41% of the content, Al-
Watan 19%, Al-Masry Al-Youm 27%, Al-Gomhouria 3% and Rose-Al-Youssef 10%. The 
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total of hate speech was 415 acts divided as follows: 144 incitements but with no mention of 
the type of incitement used, five discriminations, two incitements to violence, 16 incitements 
to killing, 139 slurs and 109 stigmatizations.  
Hate speech sources were mainly opinion article writers and journalists. The majority 
of hate speech, more than 55% of it, was practiced by opinion article writers, followed by 
around 16% found in stories written by known and unknown journalists. People presented as 
religious scholars and as Salafists were also the most outstanding performers of hate speech.  
On the other hand, more than 51% of hate speech targeted MB members, while seven 
per cent of it targeted civil society and its activists and 17% of it targeted western countries 
especially the US. 
More than 90% of the hate speech used was found in stories and articles with political 
themes.  
For the weekly newspapers, hate speech constituted 52.40% of the content of Al-
Isboa, 33.90% of Sawt-Aloma and 10.07% of the content of Alfagr. The total of hate speech 
acts was 81 times divided as follows: 35 incitements but with no mention of the type of 
incitement used, one discrimination, 20 slurs and 25 stigmatizations, while no hate speech 
related to incitement to violence or killing was found.  
The majority of hate speech, about 87.27% of it, was found in opinion pieces such as 
editorials, analyses, opinion articles, columns and comments, followed by 8.45% in news 
stories and reports, then 2.74% in headlines, followed by 0.81% in interviews, and finally 
0.54% in caricatures and images. Similar to daily newspapers, opinion articles were the major 
venue for hate speech which constituted 88% of their content, followed by stories written by 
known and unknown journalists and where hate speech constituted 11% of the content.  
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While ten per cent of hate speech targeted former political systems and presidents, the 
Muslim Brotherhood members were the most targeted by hate speech. Further stories about 
politics constituted 96.42% of hate speech and 1.79% was about the media.  
 The study is important as it shows the presence of hate speech in different newspapers 
and indicates, as well, the sources and targets of hate speech. However, its time span is short 
so further studies should be conducted on a larger time span to increase sampling accuracy 
and to be more representative of each media outlet.  
 Another study by Al Sawt Al Hurr, the Arab Network for Media Support, examined 
the CBC, Nile News, Al-Hayah and Al-Jazeera Mubashr satellite TV channels in the time 
span of 15 days, starting from the 10th to the 25th of September 2013 and aiming to measure 
the ethical standards and professionalism of different segments of the programs aired in these 
channels. The study focused on prime time which they operationalized between 7:00 pm until 
midnight. The research found that all the channels under investigation used hate speech in 
different degrees, and this negative speech sometimes came from the guests and not from the 
anchors as in Al-Hayat Al-Youm talk show (Zahra, 2014).  
The study examined 43 segments from Nile News divided among talk shows, 
interviews and news reports. Generally, in 86.5% of the analyzed content, anchors did not use 
slurs. However, in four segments, some guests used “inappropriate language” for 9.30% of 
the content and mainly targeting MB members while guests in two segments mocked them. 
Besides, 25.58% of hate speech in 11 segments was mostly directed towards MB members 
and 13.95% in another six segments included “to a certain extent” discriminatory hate speech 
(Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014). However, the study did not mention what it meant by 
‘discriminatory’ and did not clarify the study’s usage of the word “to a certain extent.” But, it 
provided examples such as the calling of MB members and the “Hamas Palestinian 
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movement” as ‘terrorists’ and assuring the viewers that the MB helped Hamas to build 
tunnels to facilitate the entry of terrorists in Sinai, Egypt, without supporting the accusation 
with information or facts (Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014). The study also found other 
accusations of corruption with no adequate information to support them (Al Sawt Al Hurr, 
2014).  
Al Sawt Al Hurr (2014) study examined 46 segments of Aljazeera Mubasher Misr 
including interviews, talk shows and news reports.  In 35 segments, 76.09% of the content 
did not include slurs as the sources interviewed held the same views as the anchor and thus 
no arguments were included, while other programs included some general accusations and 
slurs between guests. The channel used incitement speech for at least 10 times, mostly by 
guests who are pro or against Morsi’s ousting (Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014).  
Al Sawt Al Hurr (2014) examined 33 episodes of different talk shows on CBC 
channel and found that 66.67% of them were free of hate speech (Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al 
Hurr, 2014) while nine segments included 27.27% of “inappropriate language” mostly used 
by the anchors against MB members with the anchor mocking them in one or two segments 
(Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014). Seven of the analyzed segments included 21.21% cases of 
incitement, but the study did not clarify the kind of incitement made, and four segments 
included 12.12% cases of hate speech and isolation “to some extent” (Al Sawt Al Hurr, 
2014). The study did not clarify the meaning of “to some extent” but provided examples, 
such as the case when one anchor commented on a news item regarding the MB meeting in 
Istanbul and Pakistan by saying that “MB members are meeting to find destroyable ways.”  
 The study also investigated Al-Hayah Al-Youm talk show on Al-Hayat TV, which 
included 47 different segments. It found indirect speech that included negative connotations 
targeting MB members as well as six cases of mocking them and the ousted President’s 
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ruling period (Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014). The study did not find hate speech but 
mentioned that sometimes guests attacked MB members, Hamas, Turkey and its ambassador 
in Egypt (Zahra, 2014; Al Sawt Al Hurr, 2014). 
This research based its analysis on a short time span, which makes the results not 
generalizable. Besides, operational definitions and the bases of the analysis are not clear and 
this might cause ambiguity between personal opinions and hate speech and can make the 
analysis subjective.  
 Both Morsi and President Al-Sisi’s ruling periods witnessed hate speech to win 
people’s hearts and minds while the media either participated in a compulsory or in an 
optional way (Zahra, 2014). At this point, hate speech inflamed violence to the extent of 
killing others which means it succeeded in arousing people’s feelings of anger since people 
started to express their opinions violently (Zahra, 2014).  
III.7 Effects of Hate Speech  
It is argued that there are different possible effects of hate speech on victims. 
However, the harm caused differs from one person to another and depends on the setting 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2009). People exposed to hate messages can experience it in the form 
of ‘ill-treatment by others’ (Leets, 2002). This can produce different effects including short-
term effects such as “embarrassment, humiliation, mortification, intimidation, isolation, 
frustration, anger, fear, helplessness, shame, hurt, anguish, and anxiety” (Leets & Giles, 
1997).   
In their study, Dawns and Cowan (2012) mentioned that hate speech “has been a 
strong weapon in the past that could harm individuals by degrading, terrorizing, wounding 
and humiliating them” (Sevasti, 2014). Dehumanizing statements also create discriminatory 
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attitudes towards others (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 2016). In addition, if hate speech victims 
experience daily speech that conveys the message they are not valued and belittles their 
dignity, they start to disbelieve in their own self-respect and hate themselves due to the 
cumulative effect of hate messages (Ring, 2013). Consequently, one of the possible harms of 
hate speech is hurting and/or weakening people’s dignity which also causes distress and 
psychological or emotional pain (Leets, 2002).  
Leets and Giles (1997) explain that the long-term effects of hate speech involve 
“debilitating depression, sleeplessness, nightmares, withdrawal, loss of confidence, loss of 
self-esteem, psychosis, hypertension, and post-traumatic stress disorder.” Leets (2002) 
explains the effects of such trauma and how hate speech victims cope with it through the 
“Three-phase Crises Reaction Model” produced by Bard and Sangrey (1986). This model 
was applied in a couple of traumatic situations to victims of crime and violence (Leets, 2002).   
The model design divides the traumatic events into three phases, investigates 
responses over time and summarizes the similarity of responses. The effects of traumatic 
events consist of “feelings (affect), thoughts (cognition) and actions (behavior)” (Leets, 
2002). These effects can be noticed through the three expected order of “impact-
disorganization, recoil, and reorganization” (Leets, 2002).  
The “impact-disorganization” phase takes place right after the traumatic event occurs. 
At this point, the person shows emotional responses which might include “anger, disbelief, 
and a feeling of violation or vulnerability.” This period could last from hours to days (Leets, 
2002).   
The second phase, “recoil,” witnesses the emergence of short-term emotional 
responses, where the person experiences “emotional swings” such as “fear to anger” or 
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opposing responses such as blaming the self to blaming others (Leets, 2002). Other 
communal effects in this phase are “loss of identity, self-respect, and trust” (Leets, 2002).  
The third phase, “reorganization,” is the long-term stage where individuals try to cope 
and changes in their behavior occur. They start embracing a “defensive-vigilant” attitude and 
they appraise morals and behaviors to re-accommodate themselves with their daily life 
(Leets, 2002).  
Alexander Tsesis, legal scholar, says that the usage of language and vocabulary plays 
a major role psychologically in creating racist behavior (Ring, 2013). Ethnic and racial 
insults, for example, would cause “ethnic violence, which ranges from hate crimes targeting 
individuals to mass genocide” (Ring, 2013). In addition, slurs targeting race are the most used 
in discriminatory attitudes, which harms the victim’s dignity and confidence and also causes 
mental and emotional distress, the most apparent effects of discriminatory insults (Delgado, 
1982). These messages do not only affect the victim, but are even transmitted to upcoming 
generations (Delgado, 1982). Further, Delgado asserts that insults based on people’s 
characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, or race are one of the factors that deeply affect hate 
speech victims, more so than stereotyping, because these characteristics cannot be changed. 
Therefore, these victims are oversensitive and they anticipate pain when they communicate 
with others. Besides, their social relationships are affected as they have contact with people 
from other races less often (Delgado, 1982).      
Hate speech also creates stereotypes and therefore prejudice is automatically 
recognized and acknowledged by people (Roginsky & Tsesis, 2016). The demeaning 
generalization directed at minorities turns to definitions and clichés known by the society 
about the entire group (Roginsky & Tsesis, 2016). Stereotypes cause instant emotional and 
mental distress and the ability to reinforce earlier stigmas can cause long-term psychological 
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harm (Holschuh, 2014). Moreover, groups targeted by hate speech might believe allegations 
made against them (Ring, 2013).  
The effects of hate speech on its victims can also be physical, in addition to the 
mental and emotional harm, particularly if the victim experienced this speech in the presence 
of others or by a person in an authoritarian position (Holschuh, 2014 & Delgado, 1982). 
“Physical symptoms include fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, 
nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide” (Holschuh, 
2014). Insults might even cause high blood pressure (Delgado, 1982).       
Leets (2002) adds that it is argued by scholars that “words and pornographic pictures” 
might deeply and permanently hurt people since experiencing emotional and psychological 
pain can be worse and harder to tolerate than physical loss or pain, as reported by some 
people (Leets, 2002). Graumann (1998) states that “aggression itself is largely performed or 
enacted in words…. and everyday conflicts between competing and rivaling individuals ... 
are, at least in their early stages, carried out verbally” (as cited in Leets, 2002). 
Hate speech does not only affect individuals but also the whole society. For 
individuals, it can cause “pain, distress, fear, embarrassment and isolation” among other 
effects (Sevasti, 2014) while for groups, hate speech can cause inequality problems and drive 
group members to isolation (Sevasti, 2014). Also, victims may isolate themselves and 
withdraw from other victims in the same group (Holschuh, 2014). Hate speech terrifies and 
discourages group members from expressing their points of view and from integrating in their 
community especially when hate and prejudice messages are allowed in public space 
(Sevasti, 2014). Such effects can mute “the victims and therefore reinforce existing 
hierarchies in the society” (Sevasti, 2014) especially in women and minorities (Ring, 2013).   
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 In addition, during critical events, hate messages might cause obscurity of 
“sociopolitical” actors and might lead to general confusion for citizens, which might detach 
them from political engagement (Sevasti, 2014). Hate speech can also cause its victims to 
become more threatening and aggressive (Sevasti, 2014). 
Racist speech also might affect the country economically, as minority groups’ job 
opportunities as well as their personal social development are affected. This may enforce 
their perceptions of themselves and of being viewed as out-group members (Delgado, 1982).               
Discrimination further elevates the characteristics of ‘in-groups’ while it diminishes 
‘out-groups’ dignity (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 2016). It further divides people into clusters and 
creates boundaries whereas in-groups depict themselves in a positive way while out-groups 
become seen and depicted as threatening to the society and the culture (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 
2016). Discrimination might also lead to violence against groups (Ezzat, El-Banna & Aboud, 
ND)  
There is also a psychosocial model that might be applied for the in-groups and out-
groups. This is the “moral inclusion and exclusion” model where morally- excluded people 
are viewed in a negative way.  This model belittles them and their importance and therefore it 
suggests that harming morally-excluded people is fair and appropriate (Leets, 2001). 
Conversely, morally- included are people who are previewed as deserving good treatment 
and justice and if they endured any harm, people would sympathize with them (Leets, 2001).  
Victims of hate messages might respond by using drugs, alcohol, or by committing 
other types of anti-social behavior to escape the harmful negative effects they are suffering 
(Delgado, 1982).    
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III.8 Hate Speech Leads to Genocide (Rwanda’s Case) 
 
 Rwanda, the smallest country in Africa, is only 26,340 square kilometers; its history 
prior to colonization is not well-known; however, historians believe that it was inhibited by 
“Twa” pygmies people and then, around 10,000AD, the “Hutus,” mostly farmers, arrived and 
dominated the population (Magnarella, 2005). Later, between the 11th and 15th century, the 
“Tutsis” fighters, who were used to protecting “their herds against raiders and raiding for 
cattle and village goods themselves,” arrived to Rwanda. (Magnarella, 2005). The Tutsis’ 
characteristics allowed them to occupy most of Rwanda and start their own rule despite the 
fact that the Hutus outnumbered them. The Tutsis ruled by force and dominated the Hutus 
and the Twa economically, militarily and politically (Magnarella, 2005). Twa’s ethnicity in 
the historical content and during the genocide is generally forgotten and unknown, and even 
the government did not acknowledge them after the genocide (Thomson, 2009).  
 The Tutsis were superior over their counterparts (Allen & Norris, 2010) and males 
received special treatment and warrior education while the Hutus and Twas did not receive 
any education and only assisted, carried supplies and fought. The Tutsis were taught to be 
superior and “their status, military training and ideology set them apart from non-Tutsi” 
(Magnarella, 2005).    
Many Tutsis seized Hutus’ land and owned “large herds of cattle and extensive tracts 
of land.” With the population growth, many Hutus suffered from poverty and famine, 
specially that most did not own land and others owned only few plots of land. The Hutus had 
to work for the Tutsis to survive and have access to land (Magnarella, 2005). However, the 
Tutsis and the Hutus lived in harmony before Rwanda’s colonization (Thomson, 2009).  
Germany ruled Rwanda indirectly through the Tutsis from 1894 until the end of 
World War I and in 1924, Belgium became its administering authority until Rwanda’s 
independence in 1962 (Magnarella, 2005). During the German and Belgian colonization, the 
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Tutsis were favored over the Hutus. The Belgians also gave Tutsis power unlike the Hutus 
(Allen & Norris, 2010) who were forced to work in agricultural and infrastructural projects 
constructed for Belgians’ profit and those who failed to meet expectations were violently 
beaten by Tutsi chiefs, which caused hatred between them (Magnarella, 2005). The Belgians 
discriminated between the two groups further by issuing “ethnic identity cards” (Allen & 
Norris, 2010), which were a tool used during the genocide that allowed the Hutus to identify 
the Tutsis and kill them (Caplan, 2007). 
The Belgium discriminatory rule against the Hutus ended during the late 1950s (Allen 
& Norris, 2010). Pro-Hutu and pro-Tutsi parties were formed, then, in 1959, pro-Hutus 
revolted and this resulted in ethnic clashes that toppled the king (Magnarella, 2005). This 
helped them to gain power with the independence in 1962 (Alozie, 2007). In 1960, the 
Belgians started to replace Tutsis with Hutu chiefs who took control and started to oppress 
Tutsis and portray them as invaders; then, in 1963, many clashes erupted which led to the 
death of thousands of Tutsis and 130,000 Tutsis fled to neighboring countries (Magnarella, 
2005; Allen & Norris, 2010).  
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed by Tutsi refugees aiming to form a 
new government and topple President Habyarimana (Allen & Norris, 2010). Under his rule, 
the Tutsis had better status and there was little ethnic violence, but discrimination against 
them remained and the refugees were not allowed back to Rwanda; as Habyarimana said that 
there was poverty and little resources for them (Caplan, 2007). In the 1990’s, the RPF 
attacked Rwanda and clashes erupted between the Tutsis and the Hutus, supported by racist 
media (Allen & Norris, 2010) and which continued over the years. This affected the economy 
and paved the way for the genocide of 1994 (Alozie, 2007; Caplan, 2007) led by Rwandan 
officials against the Tutsi minority (Straus, 2007). All Tutsis were portrayed as RPF 
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supporters (Caplan, 2007).  
On the 6th of April, 1994, Rwanda’s President Habyarimana and Burundi President 
Ntaryamira were returning from a peace assignment (Alozie, 2007). The plane was shot down 
and crashed (Allen & Norris, 2010). Some believe that the RPF shot the plane while Caplan 
(2007) says there was no investigation so no one can be certain who the attackers were.    
The preceding incidents including discrimination, famine, poverty and clashes that 
occurred before the genocide prepared for the massacre of 1994 with the help of the media. 
The local media encouraged the killing and the international media “ignored or 
misunderstood what was happening” (Dallaire, 2007). “Hate radio” specifically had a bigger 
role than the print media as it is considered a mass medium, unlike the print media which had 
a limited circulation and was only used by the elite and the people living in cities (Straus, 
2007). The Radio gained more prominence also because most of the population in Rwanda 
could not read or write; therefore, the government used the local Radio to transmit its 
messages and used it as a propaganda tool (Des Forges, 2007).  
During the peak of the massacre, people were found holding portable radios (Dallaire, 
2007), as batteries and portable radios are cheap in Rwanda (Straus, 2007). The image of 
murderers holding the “machete” in one hand and the radio in the other is unforgettable 
(Dallaire, 2007).  
Radio Rwanda, created in 1961 and owned by the government (Kamilindi, 2007), 
started to incite for murder even before the genocide. In 1992, it claimed that a human rights 
group had warned the Hutus that the Tutsis would attack them in “Bugesera, south of the 
national capital” (Des Forges, 2007). Officials used the radio to encourage the Hutus to 
defend themselves by attacking first, and consequently hundreds of Tutsis were killed (Des 
Forges, 2007).  
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“The extremist local media, Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM),” 
played a greater role than other radios as it was considered a reliable source on issues related 
to politics and offered entertainment and breaking news (Li, 2007). However, it used the 
strong medium to stimulate hate and negatively stereotype Tutsis (MacKinnon, 2004). 
The RTML was created in 1993 by the Hutus devoted to the ideas of the people in 
authority (Straus, 2007) in order to publicize the Hutus’ elite ethno-political war against 
Tutsis’ RPF (Kimani, 2007). Similar to Radio Rwanda, it demonized the Tutsis and 
encouraged killing them. The RTML ran a campaign before the genocide indicating that 
Tutsis should not live in Rwanda and explaining how to exclude them (Dallaire, 2007). The 
radio referred to the Tutsis as dogs, cockroaches and cannibals and encouraged eliminating 
them from the society with no mercy (Chrétien, 2007). It further cheered each time a Tutsi 
family was killed and called those who did not kill them ‘cowards’ (Kamilindi, 2007). 
Broadcasters sometimes even named people and places in particular which were later 
attacked (Straus, 2007). The Hate campaign was mainly carried out by journalists and 
broadcasters more than by guests or the government (Kimani, 2007). However, authorities 
used the radio to encourage killing and to instruct people on how to do it (Des Forges, 2007). 
No one succeeded in fighting hate speech in the Rwandan media as it was extremely 
powerful and closely tied to people in power including “military, government and business” 
people (Kamilindi, 2007).  
The radio also took advantage of the historic events between the Tutsis and the Hutus 
to disseminate hate and the fear of repeating the history of Tutsi dominance (Kimani, 2007). 
It used the fear factor of an “armed attack” by the Tutsis to stimulate Hutus’ hate and 
violence against Tutsis and the Hutus supporting them (MacKinnon, 2004). The radio called 
people to attack the Tutsis and kill them mercilessly and explained how (MacKinnon, 2004).  
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In short, the RTML established ideas in the minds of the audience and made them 
hate, fear and dehumanize the Tutsis. It further paved the way for the genocide and 
legitimized aggression (Straus, 2007).   
Despite the 30 percent literacy rate in Rwanda (MacKinnon, 2004), the print media 
also played a role in spurring the killing.  For example, the bimonthly and most influential 
newspaper in the 1990s, “Kangura” (Kabanda, 2007), which is allied with Hutu power, 
(Kimani, 2007), was famous for its hatred of the Tutsis and the Hutus who wanted freedom 
and democracy (Kabanda, 2007). The newspaper was known for its “Ten Commandments of 
the Bahutu” which implied that the Tutsis are the utmost enemy and the Hutus should break 
any relations with them, like business, marriage or professional ties. The paper described the 
Tutsis as “hypocrites, thieves, killers, marked by malice and dishonesty;” while it represented 
the Hutus as “generous and naïve.”  The Tutsis were represented as “devious and aggressive” 
(MacKinnon, 2004). The newspaper further implied that Tutsi women are spies, should not 
be trusted and only seduce Hutu men to increase Tutsis’ ethnicity (MacKinnon, 2004). 
Kangura further encouraged the isolation of the Tutsis and their exclusion from any 
historical, cultural or political community and called for an authentic and pure Rwanda 
(Kabanda, 2007). However, the paper pointed that the Tutsis could join the community 
classified as nonnatives and should be closely observed as they aim to dominate and secretly 
lead to counter revolution (Kabanda, 2007). The newspaper also accused the Tutsis of 
abusing the country’s privileges which resulted in the country’s poverty, difficulty in 
accessing education, jobs, health care and scarcity in resources and less fertile lands 
(Kabanda, 2007). 
The genocide ended on July 18, 1994 (Caplan, 2007) after approximately 800,000 
persons were killed, most of whom were Tutsis and a few moderate Hutus (Allen & Norris, 
2010). Three million were evacuated (Alozie, 2007). The country was ruined with the 
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number of people who were killed, had become refugees and were exiled; many people 
suffered, were tortured, humiliated and injured while women were also raped and infected 
with AIDS. Ninety per cent of the children also suffered by witnessing the massacre (Caplan, 
2007). Despite all the suffering, months after the genocide, the radio continued to normalize 
and legitimize the massacre, showing the Tutsi as the other ethnicity that deserves to be killed 
(Chrétien, 2007).  
III.9 Hate Media Leads to Civil War (Bosnia’s Case) 
People’s republic of Yugoslavia was formed in 1946 by Josip Broz Tito with the 
Soviet Union support and it consisted of six republics, each with different ethnic group 
(Taylor & Kent, 2000). These republics were Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Shrader, 2003). Under Tito’s authoritarian rule politics 
based on ethnicity was discouraged and there was high percentage of intermarriage 
(Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). 
The Yugoslavian Union started to collapse after Tito’s death in 1980 (Covington, 
2015). Within this period economical problems started to appear, unemployment rates 
increased and high standard lifestyle people were used to was not common anymore 
(Markusen & Mennecke, 2004), the nation started to fail (Taylor & Kent, 2000).  
Bosnia, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence but many violent incidents 
and war erupted in between.  
A result of the “instability and insecurity emerged ruthless nationalistic leaders.” 
“Slobodan Milosevic” took over power in Serbia and conducted different violations targeting 
Bosnian Muslims (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). “Franjo Tudjman” ruled Croatia and used 
new laws to discriminate against Serbs who constitutes 12% of the Croatian population 
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(Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). When ethnic leaders started to take control of different 
regions the media was used as a tool to increase ethnic conflicts (Taylor & Kent, 2000). 
Both leaders controlled the public media, especially television and radio, and used it 
as a propaganda tool (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004) to mobilize people (Taylor & Kent, 
2000). Both of the leaders also showed through the media that people from their ethnicity are 
heroes and portrayed them as “in-group” people, while others are villains and are portrayed 
as “out-group” people (Taylor & Kent, 2000).   
To manipulate the public opinion in Serbia, Milosevic used the media to revive in the 
public minds old memories of World War II and how the Croatians government was 
associated with Hitler, “known as the Ustasha,” “killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs, as 
well as Jews and Gypsies” (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). Different violent incidents were 
also documented and aired on TV to revive people’s memory with the war (Markusen & 
Mennecke, 2004).  
In the meantime, in Croatia, Tudjman’s government was restoring “Ustasha’s” 
regime. For example, by naming streets “after Ustasha leaders.” After such incidents 
Milosevic propaganda was reinforced among Serbians in Croatia and in Bosnia too 
(Markusen & Mennecke, 2004).   
The leaders also oppressed independent media and marginalized political parties and 
individuals who believed in co-existence between the different ethnic groups (Markusen & 
Mennecke, 2004). The media further intensified “fears and tensions between Serbs and 
Croats and demonized Muslims” (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004).  
Slovenia and Croatia announced their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 
(Covington, 2015; Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). However, Yugoslavian Federal army 
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attacked Slovenia for 10 days to prevent its withdrawal from Yugoslavia, but the “European 
Community brokered a ceasefire” and guaranteed the independence of Slovenia. Also, “The 
Yugoslavians agreed to withdraw all troops and equipment from the region in three months” 
(Covington, 2015).  
Similarly, Croatia did not gain its independence easily, as Serbs backed with 
Yugoslavian forces, started to attack Croatia and took over around “third of the country” 
(Covington, 2015). As a response Croatia cut it ties with Yugoslavia and the violent war 
begun. Later the U.N. Security Council prevented any export of weapons to former 
Yugoslavia to end the violence, and later in the same year Croatia gained its full 
independence (Covington, 2015). However, UN peacekeepers were present to ensure 
imposing the peace agreement, this decreased the violence but the fight did not end and 
occasionally erupted until 1995 when Serbs were expelled from the country (Covington, 
2015).    
The war that occurred in Croatia in 1991 started the pattern of ethnic cleansing and 
therefore it contributed to the Bosnian war that started in in 1992 and lasted until 1995 
(Taylor & Kent, 2000). The 1991 war in Croatia was also triggered due to the failure to of 
anti-governmental and anti Milosevic demonstrations due to police violence and it resulted in 
ethnic war between Serbs, Croats and Muslims (Ramet, 2002). Serbians also took control of 
30 percent of Croatia. Serbian’s and Croatian’s forces signed an agreement to stop fighting 
but one year later in 1992 and during the demonstrations anniversary around 30,000 Serbians 
protested to demand Milosevic’s to step-down among other demands, but again they did not 
succeed (Ramet, 2002).  
As Bosnian leaders wanted to extend the region, the Bosnian civil war started (Taylor 
& Kent, 2000). Bosnia-Herzegovina announced its independence in 1992 (Markusen & 
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Mennecke, 2004). But Bosnian Serbs started fighting, while “Serbia and Montenegro” 
created the New Federal of Yugoslavia and gained little international recognition, unlike the 
countries that announced their independence before (Covington, 2015).  
The civil war was mainly between Bosnians (Muslims), Bosnians Serbs (Orthodox 
Christians) and Bosnian Croats (Catholics) (Taylor & Kent, 2000). During this time the 
media created unity within the same ethnic group but through stereotyping and demonizing 
groups from different ethnicity (Taylor & Kent, 2000). Through nationalistic media, the 
leaders disseminated hatred among different ethnic groups which lead to 1992-1995 civil war 
(Taylor & Kent, 2000).  
 Tudjman also declared that Croatia will expand into Bosnia-Herzegovina and stated 
to the press that if Bosnia declared its independence this will harm the survival of Croatians, 
and the republic’s strategic interests (Ramet, 2002). During the Bosnian war all the leaders 
used the media to incite and mobilize each ethnic group towards the war and the media 
reinforced “cultural stereotypes and demonized other ethnic groups.” The messages affected 
the target audience as well as it frightened each minority group living in different regions 
(Taylor & Kent, 2000). When the propaganda started ethnic minorities had to flee and those 
who did not, were forced to leave or were killed (Taylor & Kent, 2000).  
Besides fighting the government, Serbs with the Yugoslavian support started ethnic 
cleansing to create a state of “pure Bosnians” (Covington, 2015). Bosnian Serbs further 
forced Bosnian Muslims to flee to Srebrenica (Mulaj, 2017). Bosnian Serbs also created 
“detention camps” which was usually overloaded and detainees witnessed different violations 
including murdering, torturing, beating, and sexually assaulting women and men. Like 
Bosnian Serbs also Muslims and Croatians forces murdered and tortured other Serbs in 
camps (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). 
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 On May, Both the Yugoslavian and Bosnian governments reached a peace 
agreement. “Yugoslavia withdrew their forces from Bosnia, but left their heavy weapons in 
the hands of the Bosnian Serbs,” therefore, violence increased all-over the country 
(Covington, 2015). 
 In 1992 the U.N. security council founded a “war crimes commissions” to examine 
the reports about “mass rape, torture, starvation, and executions committed by all sides, 
particularly the Bosnian Serbs.” There were also different trials to resolve the war, but they 
failed and Bosnian Serbs continued attacking U.N. safe areas. Also Bosnian Serbs and Croats 
refused to create passage to deliver aid to Bosnian Muslims (Covington, 2015).  
There was hope for ending the war by mid-December 1994, when Radovan Karadzic 
the Bosnian Serb leader “invited former President Carter to visit Bosnia” hoping to reach 
peace agreement. However, in 1995 Bosnian Serbs attacked Srebrenica which was announced 
as a safe area by the U.N. in 1993, they further arrested Dutch peacekeepers. Bosnian Serbs 
also killed around 7,000 Bosnian Muslims civilians in one week (Mulaj, 2017) and left them 
in mass graves. While most of those killed were boys and men, the attackers continued to 
threaten and rape women and girls (Covington, 2015). Later after this massacre occurred the 
“North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (NATO) started to attack “Serbs military targets” by air 
strikes, also Milosevic who supported Bosnian Serbs started to negotiate peace agreements 
because he wanted to lift “the heavy economic and cultural embargo that had been placed on 
Yugoslavia” for supporting the Bosnian war. Finally, in November 1995 the war ended with 
the peace talks between different countries including the “United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia” (Markusen & Mennecke, 2004). 
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This war is considered the worst in Europe after the holocaust and it claimed around 
100,000 people’s lives (Covington, 2015; Mulaj, 2017) and injured many. Besides, more than 
two million were exiled (Mulaj, 2017). 
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Chapter IV 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
IV.1 Framing Theory 
 
Some artists carefully choose how they frame their artistic creations as they 
understand the prominence and importance of the frame for their painting and how it affects 
the audience’s perspective towards the painting (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). Similarly, is 
framing in the field of communication, journalists choose how to describe the political world 
through their choice of words and images that have the power to affect the way the audience 
understands the communicated message (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). Framing events and 
issues in a certain way is one of the most effective ways the media use to influence public 
opinion. This framing contains a “communication source presenting and defining an issue” 
(De Vreese, 2005). This research uses the framing theory since hate speech is a form of 
framing and because hate speech consists of a source presenting a certain topic through a 
medium. The communicator chooses certain words to frame hate messages and chooses what 
to highlight and what to obscure, which makes this theory relevant to the topic.     
 The ‘framing theory’ was first introduced by Erving Goffman and aims to show how 
powerful the communicated text message is (Entman, 1993). It includes the ways of selecting 
and highlighting some issues and therefore their salience (Entman, 1993), while obscuring 
other information (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). “To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a text in order to be 
communicated in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, a causal 
interpretation, a moral evaluation, and/or a treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(Entman, 1993). This offers a way of understanding the issue (De Vreese, 2005). The framing 
theory implies that there are steps where an individual develops a way of understanding and 
 81 
thinking about a certain issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The theory further suggests that 
the same topic can be perceived through different ways and can be interpreted differently 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
While there is a divergence of political contexts and message spheres (Lee, McLeod 
& Shah, 2008), news framing can be analyzed and recognized through “the presence or 
absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and 
sentences that provide thematically- reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (De Vreese, 
2005). As framing affects the audience, journalists are affected too; studies found that when 
some newspapers frame an event in a certain way, other newspapers follow the same framing 
and this is coined by Fishman as “news wave” (Scheufele, 1999).       
 Tankard (2001) suggests 11 framing methods to distinguish and measure news 
frames.  These are: “headlines, subheads, photos, photo captions, leads, source selection, 
quotes selection, pull quotes, logos, statistics and charts, and concluding statements and 
paragraphs” (De Vreese, 2005). 
 Four features in the communication process are also suggested. These are “the 
communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture” (Entman, 1993). The communicator 
builds the framing through choosing what to say directed by frames according to the 
communicator’s beliefs, either intentionally or unintentionally while the text includes frames 
that are directed by the existence or lack of “certain key-words, stock phrases, stereotyped 
images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically-reinforcing clusters 
of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993). The frame guides the receivers’ beliefs, but it is not 
necessary that a framing effect or the original intention of the communicator take place 
(Entman, 1993). It is also not necessary that the audience approve the frame presented to 
them, but the frame still acts like guidelines that indirectly outline how the audience will 
understand and interpret the message (Batziou, 2011). Finally, the culture, which is mainly 
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“the stock of commonly invoked frames, might be defined as the empirically demonstrable 
set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and the thinking of most people in a social 
grouping” (Entman, 1993). 
There are different aspects that affect audience interpretation of the frame. The “frame 
in thought,” for example, is a “set of dimensions” that affects the person’s appraisal of a 
certain subject (Chong & Druckman, 2007). For instance, if a person is asked about the right 
of hate group to demonstrate in a way that stresses the prominence of free speech then ‘the 
frame in thought’ that the person will embrace is free speech (Chong & Druckman, 2007). On 
the other hand, if prominence is given to “free speech, public safety, and the effect of the 
rally on the community’s reputation” then the individual ‘frame in thought’ will constitute a 
mixture of thoughts (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In short, ‘the frame in thought’ is the major 
aspect that affects the final opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007). This is why politicians try to 
highlight specific characteristics of their policy to encourage people into thinking in a certain 
way (Chong & Druckman, 2007).   
The repetition of a news frame also affects people exposed to it. Nowadays, media 
outlets are present, both online and offline, and therefore, the likelihood of increasing 
exposure to the same frames is increased, which is called the “echo chamber effect” 
(Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). The repetition of the same news frame is also 
increased due to the growth of the professional political public relations which leads 
journalists to depend on a limited scope of similar sources when they write news stories 
(Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015).   
It is argued that the likelihood of repeating news or one-sided framing is when it is 
“scandalous, contentious, or value-laden” (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). 
Mitchell (2014) suggests that political scandals are the most likely to receive repetitive 
coverage by the media where “one (negative) aspect of a political actor is highlighted 
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repeatedly over a period of time” (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). Also, after 
scandalous information is leaked, the media and political professionals spread similar 
messages to suppress other oppositional sides from different media outlets (Lecheler, Keer, 
Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). The audience is also affected, because when people are exposed 
to the same negative or positive frame repeatedly, they search for the same frame again, and 
will mostly ignore other competitive opposing frames (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 
2015).      
Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli (2015) conducted a study to evaluate “both the 
strength and the duration of effects of repetitive framing over time.” They exposed the 
participants in the study to positive or negative news frames on the same topic. The study 
showed that news repetition increased the strength of the negative frame unlike the positive 
frame. Also, the repetitive exposure to the frame leads to a framing effect that is more 
enduring than a single exposure (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). The effect of the 
positive frame took place but weakened over time as compared with those exposed to the 
positive frame only once (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015).  
Participants with moderate political knowledge “displayed the longest lasting framing 
effects” (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015) while participants with less political 
knowledge were mostly affected by the frame in the short-term. Participants with high 
political knowledge were affected by the frame too but they tended to reject the argument as 
they have more ability to “encounter other information” through time (Lecheler, Keer, 
Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). Both high and medium-knowledge participants were affected by 
repetitive exposure of positive frames while low-knowledge participants encountered a 
decrease in the effect after the repetition of a positive frame (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & 
Hänggli, 2015). 
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Framing theory overlaps with other theories. The term framing and priming, as well 
as agenda-setting, are used interchangeably (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Both framing and 
priming tell people “what to think about” and hence form their attitudes (Entman, 2010). 
Framing is the presentation of issues and events while the agenda-setting theory refers to the 
salience of these issues and events (De Vreese, 2005). According to Price and Tewksbury 
(1997), framing is perceived as an applicability effect while priming and agenda-setting are 
perceived as an accessibility effect (Lee, McLeod, & Shah, 2008).  
IV.2 Frame Building and Frame Setting  
 Frame-building is the internal and external features that impact a news frame (De 
Vreese, 2005). The internal ones are the influences that affect journalists and their 
organizations’ framing of the news (De Vreese, 2005). Journalistic frames are affected by 
journalists’ “ideology, attitudes, and professional norms” (Scheufele, 1999). The frame is 
further affected by the political orientation of the media outlet transmitting the information 
(Scheufele, 1999) while the external factors include “political actors, authorities, interest 
groups and other elites.”  Therefore, frames suggested by these groups, their ideologies and 
beliefs are reflected through journalists’ frames (Scheufele, 1999). Frame-building is the 
constant interaction between journalists, social movements and the elite (De Vreese, 2005).  
The elite want people to behave and think in a certain way and this is why they choose what 
to tell people while they obscure other information (Entman, 2010).    
 On the other hand, frame-setting is the interaction between the frame and the 
audiences’ pre-existing knowledge and attitudes (De Vreese, 2005). Frame- setting is also 
labeled as a second level of agenda- setting by McCombs and his colleagues as it is 
concerned with the salience of the issues (Scheufele, 1999). Frames can be on an individual 
level where a person’s attitude will change after being exposed to the frame and on the 
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societal level where the frame can affect “political socialization, decision- making, and 
collective actions” (De Vreese, 2005). 
IV.3 Framing Effect 
The framing effect refers to how different frames affect people’s attitudes and beliefs 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007) and how they comprehend the news frame (Lecheler, Keer, 
Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). Framing effects and responding to the frame also differ from one 
individual to another (Entman, 2010). Opinions that people already hold also affect how 
responsive they are to the frame. For example, those with strong beliefs are less responsive to 
frames opposing their beliefs (Chong & Druckman, 2007).   
Also, the level of peoples’ political knowledge influences the framing effect. People 
with high levels of political knowledge experience higher framing effects, according to some 
studies, but they are expected to resist the frame or evaluate it according to their existing 
beliefs as time passes (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). Also, people having low 
political knowledge will arguably be affected, but they will not build on the frame because 
they “process news frames superficially.” Thus, the initial frame effect will not be 
strengthened through repetition (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015). However, 
moderately-aware individuals have strong framing effects as they build on repetition. They 
are the “most susceptible to media effects over time because “they pay enough attention,” but 
“lack the resources to resist” as Zaller (1992) argues. They are the most likely to show long-
term framing effects (Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, & Hänggli, 2015).   
Framing is further a cognitive process which activates certain constructs where the 
“audience members use premises or guiding principles in information- processing and 
judgment tasks” as heuristics in order to form opinions or make judgments (Lee, McLeod & 
Shah, 2008).  In other words, the information and knowledge stored in the minds of the 
audience before being exposed to the frame helps them either consciously or subconsciously 
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to determine how the new information, through the frame, will fit into their “understandings 
and feelings about the world” (Entman, 2010).  
The frame effect takes place when the information is stored in the memory, retrieved 
and used as the audience is exposed to the frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The 
information should be accessible in the mind, which happens “through regular or recent 
exposure” to the message where the information becomes accessible to individuals in an 
unconscious and passive way (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Sometimes people build their 
opinions based on the accessible information and, at other times, they deliberately evaluate 
the information (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
There are three further ways which the audience uses to process the information. First 
is the “active processing” where the person seeks to find additional information believing that 
media messages are generally incomplete and are affected by the communicator. The second 
type is the “reflective integrated pondering.” People think about the message they are 
exposed to or they immerse into discussions with others to fully comprehend the message. 
Last, are the “selective scanners” who only skim through media messages and therefore they 
choose to be exposed to relevant information while they ignore irrelevant ones that do not 
interest them (Scheufele, 1999).   
  Another factor for framing effects to take place is applicability which is “the 
‘goodness of fit’ between some stored knowledge and the attended features of a stimulus” 
(Lee, McLeod & Shah, 2008). Applicability grows when there is more “overlap between 
stored knowledge and the message stimulus” (Lee, McLeod & Shah, 2008). 
 Applicability will take place in two situations. First, if people are personally 
motivated, they will evaluate opposing beliefs that either instantly come to their minds or are 
proposed by the frame. Second, when they are exposed to competing considerations, they 
will be encouraged to deliberately engage in evaluation (Chong, & Druckman, 2007).  In 
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short, individuals form their beliefs from previous knowledge stored in their memory. “Only 
some beliefs become accessible at a given moment,” and from these accessible beliefs, some 
are considered solid or applicable to be appropriate for the subject they are evaluating 
(Chong, & Druckman, 2007).  “Framing can work on all three levels, by making new beliefs 
available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs 
applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluation” (Chong, & Druckman, 2007).  
It is important to note that knowledge and information will be retrieved if the amount 
of both applicability and accessibility are adequate, though not all the retrieved information 
will be used to make judgments (Lee, McLeod & Shah, 2008). In addition, “strength, 
repetition, a competitive environment, and individual motivation” are factors that should be 
present for a frame effect to take place (Chong, & Druckman, 2007). Credible sources are 
also one of the factors that constitute a strong frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007).   
IV.4 Agenda-Setting Theory 
 
 Agenda-setting is an important aspect of democracy as it is linked with public 
opinion. Besides, “attention, consensus and problem-solving” are some terms associated with 
public opinion (Moon, 2008). The media directs citizens’ attention to some issues or 
problems, and consequently, creates consensus among the audience about how vital those 
issues or problems are (Moon, 2008). Therefore, citizens are encouraged to solve these 
problems and this is generally referred to as “civic engagement” (Moon, 2008).  
 The salience of news and the capability of influencing the public agenda is called the 
“agenda- setting role of the news media.” Journalists have the ability to influence public 
opinion through bringing certain issues into peoples’ attention by increasing their salience in 
the news (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Selected issues are repeatedly and prominently 
portrayed in the media which makes people think they are more important than other issues 
(Wu & Coleman, 2009). However, different researchers extended agenda-setting effects to 
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affect opinions, feelings and attitudes (Moon, 2008). The theory mainly implies that the 
media creates the salience of issues in the public perception, and decides what topics people 
think about (Sharma, 2012). “Lasswell believed that the media plays a critical role in 
directing our attention to issues” to create “a correlation of attention on certain issues by the 
media, the public and policymakers at the same time” (Moon, 2008).  
As agenda-setting is related to directing the public opinion through the salience of the 
issues, it becomes relevant to this research as it will examine the frequency of hate speech 
used in the media and therefore directs the audience to hate certain groups or individuals. 
Also, the study examines whether hate speech victims change according to the ruling 
government or not, which will show whether the newspapers are affected by the 
governmental agenda or not.  
 Walter Lippman argued that there is a difference between reality and the image in 
people’s mind (Tan & Weaver, 2009). In the early 1920s, he declared that public opinion 
responds to the “pseudo-environment” which is created by the news; in other words, peoples’ 
opinions and perspectives are based on what the media exposes them to (McCombs & 
Reynolds, 2009). Lippman’s argument was later supported when McCombs and Shaw 
surveyed undecided voters during the presidential elections in Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
and studied whether “the media can set the public agenda.” They found a high “correlation 
between the people’s agenda and the total news agenda” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
Later, hundreds of empirical studies also supported the connotation of the agenda-setting 
effects: what the media stresses, the public stresses too (Moon, 2008). McCombs and Shaw 
also found that there is a very close association between the media and the public agenda on 
issues related to “foreign policy, law and order, economics, public welfare and civil rights” 
(Besova & Cooley 2009).    
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 There are different factors that set the agenda including social ideologies and the 
psychology of journalists, politicians, public officials, public relations practitioners and other 
individuals including the presidents (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). For example, state media 
depends on information from the government which makes it reflect its agenda (Tan & 
Weaver, 2009).    
 There is also a factor called “inter-media agenda-setting” which is the influence of 
different media outlets on each other (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). For example, when a 
major news outlet publishes something, other media outlets follow and do the same. Also, 
websites sometimes have an impact on traditional media (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009).  
Some studies even found that op-ed pages in major newspapers were influenced by blog-
activism (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009).   
IV.5 Agenda Setting Attributes and Levels 
 The agenda-setting theory is further explained through objects and attributes. The 
objects in agenda setting are generally “public issues.” These objects fight to gain attention, 
and each object (e.g. candidates) has its various “attributes” (e.g. the image) which are 
characteristics that describe these issues (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Attributes are a 
mixture between the agenda-setting theory and framing theory (Besova & Cooley, 2009). 
Both objects and their attributes differ in their salience and are powerful tools for agenda 
setting (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009).  
 ‘Attributes’ have two different dimensions, the “cognitive component” which is the 
information that describes the objects and the “affective component” which refers to the 
positive, neutral, or negative tone that describes the objects in the media (McCombs & 
Reynolds, 2009); the affective component focuses on the emotional qualities of attributes” 
(Wu & Coleman, 2009) just as framing negative attributes leads people to think negatively 
about the object (Besova & Cooley, 2009). Attributes in agenda-setting further indicate that 
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the media does not only tell us “what to think,” but also how to think (Besova & Cooley, 
2009), exactly like the framing theory.  
 There are two levels of agenda-setting; the first level refers to the salience of issues 
and the quantity of coverage of a certain issue, suggesting that the media chooses the subjects 
that the audience will be aware of (Wu & Coleman, 2009).  
Priming is an effect of the first level of agenda-setting (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
Priming is when the audience makes decisions based on information available while making 
the judgment instead of going through a cognitive analysis of the stored information 
(McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Priming also implies that the salience of issues affects 
people’s assessment of public figures, and has an important role in affecting people’s 
behavior and attitude (Moon, 2008).  
The second level of agenda-setting refers to the attributes and how journalists frame 
the object’s characteristics (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). The attributes of objects can be 
highlighted in certain ways that affect its salience (Sharma, 2012). The implication of 
attributes in agenda-setting overlap with the main idea of framing theory; however, as 
discussed before, the major difference between framing theory and agenda-setting theory is 
accessibility, which is linked with agenda-setting and applicability which is linked with 
framing (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). In addition, attribute priming is the effect of the 
second level of agenda setting (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
IV.6 Need for Orientation 
 The effects of agenda-setting depend on how familiar people are with the subject 
(Besova & Cooley, 2009). Obtrusive and unobtrusive issues are referred to in order to justify 
people’s familiarity with the subject and their potential ‘need for orientation.’ 
  The term “need for orientation” was coined by Maxwell, McCombs and Weaver in 
the early 1970s  (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014) based on the cognitive mapping theory 
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contributed by Psychologist Edward Tolman, which is similar to Lippman’s argument that 
“we form maps in our minds to help us navigate our external environment” (McCombs & 
Reynolds, 2009). The term “need for orientation” refers to the fact that individuals need to be 
acquainted with their physical and cognitive surroundings (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 
2014).    
 Besides the media, there are other factors which help people gain information like 
direct personal experience.  These are called “obtrusive issues” (McCombs & Reynolds, 
2009). For example, when people experience price soaring, they do not need the media to tell 
them so. On the other hand, people need the media to help them understand some issues that 
they cannot have direct personal experience with.  These are the “unobtrusive issues” 
(McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Sometimes, issues can be both obtrusive and unobtrusive 
depending on an individual’s experiences (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
 If the issue is irrelevant (unobtrusive) to individuals, then the need for orientation will 
decrease while, if the issue is relevant or obtrusive but the individual’s uncertainty level is 
low, then the need for orientation is moderate (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). If both 
relevance and uncertainty are high, then the need for orientation will be high too (McCombs 
& Reynolds, 2009). This means that when the need for orientation increases, the effect of 
agenda-setting will increase too and agenda-setting is stronger when it addresses unobtrusive 
issues (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). 
 Matthes (2006) conducted a study and in it, he suggested that the “need for cognition” 
is a predictor for the need of orientation along with relevance. According to the study, there 
are at least three separate types of “Need for Orientation” toward issues, facts, and 
journalistic evaluations” (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014).  
 It was further found that passive media users have less need for orientation than active 
media users while “moderate-active need for orientation users, (high relevance and low 
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uncertainty) use partisan media more than those with a high level of need for orientation, 
(high relevance and high uncertainty)” (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014). Therefore, it is 
assumed that individuals with a “moderate-active” level of need for orientation might be 
seeking certain conclusions (directional goals) while individuals with a high level of need for 
orientation seek accurate conclusions (accuracy goals) (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014).     
In addition, individuals “with a low and moderate-passive (low relevance and high 
uncertainty)” need for orientation level interpret media messages in a passive way and they 
are not regular users of the media which consequently limits their agenda-setting effects 
(McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014). On the other hand, individuals with a high and 
“moderate-active” need for orientation level are more active in seeking mediated messages 
and are less vulnerable to accessibility biases. 
 Individuals with a “moderate-active” need for orientation are attracted to partisan 
media which results in “high first-and second-level agenda-setting effects” while individuals 
with high need for orientation are attracted to mainstream media that have less partisanship, 
which results in “strong first-level” (object) agenda-setting effects, but only moderate 
second-level (attribute) effects” (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014).   
Generally, it was found that the more the media can focus on a certain object, the 
more people will form opinions about it. Also, the salience of these objects and their 
attributes affect opinions (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). The effects of agenda-setting can be 
concluded by what research supports, namely “what the public thinks about something can be 
extended to what the public does about something” (Moon, 2008).  
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Chapter V 
METHODOLOGY  
V.1 Research Questions  
1. Is there hate speech in the Egyptian Arabic language newspapers and what types of 
hate speech are used and to what extent (quantity)?  
2. Who is the source of hate speech? 
3. Does the media practitioner try to combat the speech if it is used by the source? 
4. Did the victims of hate speech differ according to different governments (Morsi’s, 
Mansour’s and Al-Sisi’s) and how? 
This study will examine hate speech in the Egyptian media using the quantitative 
approach of content analysis. The study will examine the presence or absence of hate speech, 
the type of hate speech that is mostly used and those who use this speech (e.g. the sources or 
media practitioners) as well as who the major victims of hate speech are and if they changed 
according to the ruling government. The span of the study will be from June 2012 until June 
2015.  
V.2 Quantitative Approach: Content Analysis  
 
 Content analysis is one of the research approaches that is commonly used by mass 
media researchers because it is an effective way of examining media content (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2011). There are different definitions of content analysis, among them is a 
definition by Walizer and Wienir (1978) which explains it as “any systematic procedure 
devised to examine the content of recorded information.” Another definition is presented by 
Kerlinger (2000) which states that it is a “method of studying and analyzing communication 
in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” 
(Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). This means communication is analyzed through some 
procedures where “each item must have an equal chance of being included in the analysis” 
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and each item is treated equally and given an equal amount of time. Further objectivity means 
that the researcher should exclude all personal opinions and biases, and variables should be 
operationalized to avoid extreme variances if more than one researcher analyzed the same 
content (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Finally, the quantitative approach briefly means 
having accurate representation of the analysis instead of an approximate one (Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2011).  
 In hate speech sphere, content analysis also is used as an approach to investigate 
possible hate messages “within their social and political context to understand the meanings, 
motivations, and ideologies behind the messages” and to decipher the components of a 
message and its delivery (Lucas, 2014). Content analysis on hate speech is usually “labor-
intensive” which is one of the reasons why usually “small sets of data” of around hundreds of 
messages are analyzed (Lucas, 2014). However, this study will investigate a bigger sample to 
analyze hate speech more deeply.      
 As there are different uses of content analysis according to Wimmer and Dominick 
(2011), this study aims to implement more than one of them. First is “describing 
communication content” where this study aims to describe whether the communicated 
messages include hate speech or not and how they developed or changed over the time span 
of the study, and who the sources of the speech are. Second is “assessing the image of 
particular groups in a society” where the study will investigate how different groups are 
targeted by hate speech. Finally, is “establishing a starting point for studies of media effects” 
as this study aims to be a starting point for further studies to understand the effects of hate 
speech on both the victims and the audience.    
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V.3 Defining the Universe  
This study focused on analyzing newspapers because they have a prominent role in 
societies, they have strong effects and they attract broad audiences. Totalitarian governments 
that try to control and censor the media are attracted to certain media and not to the content. 
For example, books are not rigorously censored because they mainly attract the educated 
elites, unlike other media and daily newspapers (Webb, 2014). This shows that newspapers 
usually attract a wide audience. Newspapers also have prominent effects. For example, 
research found that the decline in newspaper readership is correlated with voter turnout 
(Moon, 2008) which means that newspapers have a prominent role in affecting peoples’ 
behavior. Also, Abdulla (2013) asserts that print media are the medium that sets the agenda 
for the society, which further indicates the importance of newspapers. 
The papers under examination were the state-owned daily newspaper Al-Ahram, the 
independent daily newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm and the partisan daily newspaper Al-Wafd. 
The choice of newspapers was designed to include different types of popular newspapers 
including state, independent, and partisan papers. The three newspapers were also chosen as 
they are the most widely read in Egypt. Al-Ahram is the top selling state-owned newspaper 
(Egypt Today, 2017). Al-Masry Al-Youm is the most successful and most widely read 
independent newspaper and Al-Wafd is among the partisan newspapers with the highest 
circulation (Allam, N/D). However, it is hard to know the exact circulation due to the lack of 
market transparency, according to Hisham Kassem (Berger, 2013).  
The online copies were excluded because when hate speech is used by a newspaper 
and it stirs arguments and criticism either through social networks or opposing media outlets, 
it is sometimes permanently deleted from the online version.  
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 The span of the study was from June 30, 2012 to June 30, 2015. This period starts 
when the ousted President Morsi became the President of Egypt, followed by former 
President Mansour and ending with the current President Al-Sisi’s rule. Morsi ruled for 
around 13 months starting from June 30, 2012 and ending on July 3, 2013. Mansour ruled for 
around 12 months starting from July 3, 2013 and ending on June 8, 2014. The current 
President Al-Sisi’s rule was examined for the period of around 12 months from June 8, 2014 
to 30 June 2015. Only one year of Al-Sisi’s ruling period was examined despite the fact that 
he has been in office for a longer period to simply investigate the same length of time similar 
to what is examined for Morsi and Mansour as both stayed in office only one year.   
 The study’s starting point was when Morsi became the President, because as shown in 
the literature, media polarization increased during this period and was later deepened 
(Abdulla, 2014), which might increase hate speech usage.    
V.4 Population (Sample)   
This research used a composite week approach, because according to Wimmer and 
Dominick (2011), this technique is better than others while analyzing newspaper content.    
 The week was constructed based on Wimmer and Dominick’s (2011) explanation of 
the composite week. One day of the week was randomly chosen from the month, then this 
day was replaced by another from the upcoming month and so on until finally one week was 
fully constructed. For example, a Sunday was randomly chosen from the four different 
Sundays of the month followed by Monday from the upcoming month and so on until the 
week was constructed.  
This paper sampled 12 issues each year as an efficient approach for analyzing large 
amounts of newspaper content. It did not increase the sample beyond the 12 issues because 
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according to Wimmer, Dominick (2011), this did not “significantly improve sampling 
accuracy.”   
 In addition, the front pages of each newspaper were analyzed mainly because front 
pages include the most prominent and salient news and summary of the news or feature 
stories inside the paper. Opinion articles and caricatures were excluded from the analysis 
because they were rarely found in the front pages. Also advertisements were excluded from 
the analysis because they were not based on news framing, which is the major scope of the 
study. The total number of front pages analyzed from the three papers were 111.  
V.5 Unit of Analysis and Operationalization 
 The unit of analysis is the verbal speech uttered that shows the usage of hate speech 
while taking into consideration the context the speech was articulated through. The unit of 
analysis is also based on the literature review and previous research examined hate speech.  
 Operational definitions are constructed to avoid any potential bias by the coders and 
to minimize subjectivity.    
• Hate speech: This term refers to “incitement to violence, discrimination and to 
rejecting others” (Eissa, Elias & Kasseb, 2016). It also consists of the following 
variables:   
• Violence/ Incitement to violence: This refers to Speech that advocates or incites to 
violence (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012) such as threats, beating, robbery, rape and killing 
(executing) others (Besemer, 2012).  
• Slurs: This refers to speech that contains insults or offensive terms (Ianto-Petnehazi, 
2012) which target people based on their descriptive features like their race or sexual 
identity (Croom, 2013). Slurs used without mentioning people’s race, sexual identity 
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or descriptive features is not hate speech but a way of expressing anger (Croom, 
2013).  
• Threats: This refers to speech that includes threats without clearly inciting to 
violence such as, for example, “You should stop what your group is doing or else...”. 
“…our patience is coming to an end”, “You should not provoke us because....” (Ianto-
Petnehazi, 2012). 
• Stereotypes: This refers to generalizations about certain groups such as, for example, 
“we should be doubtful about group B because they want to destroy the country.” “All 
of group B are criminals.” “All members of group B hate/despise us.” “People of 
group B are immoral and they will corrupt our (A) youth.” “Group B has some 
despicable customs/traditions that threaten our society.” This implies that a certain 
group should not be trusted because of certain characteristics. “Group B are thieves so 
they should be sterilized” saying that all members of a certain group are terrorists 
(Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012)         
• Isolation and rejecting or excluding others: This refers to the claim that a certain 
group is the original owner of the country and/or that the other group does not have 
the right to live in this country or abide by its traditions (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).    
• Conspiracy/Foreign interests/Enemies: Implying that others “are part of a 
conspiracy against the country/society, serving some foreign or malicious interests” 
and implying, as well, that if a person is a member of a certain group or seeking rights 
for that group, or rights for its members or rights for its leaders then this person is an 
enemy of the state/people/society, and/or is a threat (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).   
• Shame of the country: This refers to arguing that certain groups or individuals are a 
shame for the country and blaming them for the negative image of the country (Ianto-
Petnehazi, 2012).  
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• Discrimination: This refers to any speech that discriminates, advocates, or 
rationalizes discrimination, which is “any differentiation, exclusion, restriction or 
preference based on group appartenance and any other criteria, (Ianto-Petnehazi, 
2012).  
• Race and ethnic group: These are, for example, Bedouins and Nubians (Abdulla, 
2013b). 
• Xenophobia: This refers to speech that is spreading fear of foreigners (Sundstrom, & 
Kim, 2014) and inciting hatred or rejection of them, especially Westerners (Elliott et 
al., 2016).   
• Nationalist hate speech: This refers to hate speech targeting nationalist citizens from 
Arab countries because of to their opposing views on Egyptian politics Elliott et al., 
2016).   
• Dehumanization: Portraying others as animals, less human than others (sub-human), 
denying their identity as being independent and can make decisions (Haslam, 2006). 
Dehumanization takes the form of attacking other individuals or groups’ dignity as 
well as rationalizing injurious actions against them (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 2016). 
• Rationalizing injurious acts: This refers to giving reasons and justifications for 
violence and incitement to violence.  
• Religious Minorities: These are, for example, Christians, Jews, Baha’is (Abdulla, 
2013b). 
• Religious extremism: This refers to threatening others and limiting their rights based 
on religious arguments (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012).  
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V.6 Inter-coder Reliability  
The coding of this research was conducted by the researcher and an independent 
coder while a third independent coder was trained and introduced to the operational 
definitions to measure inter-coder reliability. A random subsample was chosen out of the 
whole sample for the inter-code reliability, where a percentage was chosen from the original 
two coders’ sample and was compared with the third coder’ responses. Finally inter-coder 
reliability was calculated using Holsti (1969) formula   =
2 (𝑚)
n1+𝑛2
 which is used with nominal 
data (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). The “M is the number of coding decisions on which two 
coders agree, and N1 and N2 are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second 
coder, respectively” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).  
 The total number of texts which compared between the first two coders and the third 
coder is 77 and the coding decisions agreed upon are 75. Coding decisions 
2 (75)
77+77
 = 0.975 
hence the median equals 97%, therefore the inter-coder reliability found is high and shows 
that the research results is reliable.  
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Chapter VI 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
VI.1 Results Overview   
The results of this content analysis are based on the analysis of 111 front pages of Al-
Ahram, Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Wafd newspapers. The total number of texts analyzed is 
1127 divided between news stories, headlines, headlines with subtitles, feature stories, and 
articles. The time frame of the study starts from June 2012 until June 2015.  
The analyses were divided first by determining whether the text includes hate speech 
or not, based on the aforementioned definitions. If no hate speech was found, the text was 
excluded. If hate speech was found, the text was further analyzed to find which type of hate 
speech is used, who the source of the hate speech is, who the target of the hate speech is, and 
if the writer tried to fight hate speech through opposing it or interviewing opposing sources or 
not. Also, sometimes the input of the coding was “nuanced,” which means that the text was 
leaning toward hate speech but there was no clear hate speech type used.   
An example of nuanced hate speech was describing how Morsi’s wife was travelling 
to Alexandria and was staying in Al-Montazah palace to avoid protests surrounding Al-
Ouroba palace in Cairo and to avoid hot weather. The news added that Muslim Brotherhood 
members were protecting her and the palace. The news item also added that Morsi will spend 
the last ten days of Ramadan in Al-Montaza palace. The story explained in details how they 
were spending their time in a relaxing and luxurious environment. The story was considered 
as nuanced hate speech because there was no clear hate speech type; however, the news was 
not supported by any facts or name of source and was framed in a provocative way especially 
that, during this period, there were many protests by different sects in the society. 
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VI.2 Analysis and Discussion  
RQ1: Is there hate speech in Egyptian newspapers, to what extent (quantity) and what 
types of hate speech are used?  
Hate speech usage: Hate speech was found more in the privately-owned Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper followed by Al-Wafd party newspaper, and finally by the state-owned 
Al-Ahram newspaper. Since hate speech naturally has negative implications, it is clear that 
the framing and attributes of text including hate speech are negative. The results further show 
that state-owned newspapers are more careful when using hate speech, unlike the privately-
owned Al-Masry Al-Youm and the party newspaper Al-Wafd. Similarly, Al-Sawt Al-Hurr’s 
study also showed that state-media used hate speech the least as the state-owned daily 
newspaper, Al-Gomhouria used hate speech for only 3% of its content.  
The sample used during the time span of the study contained 3.6% of direct hate 
speech and 2.5% of nuanced hate speech. On the other hand, 93.8% of the analyzed text did 
not use hate speech. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper sample contained 4.6% of hate speech, 
Al-Ahram newspaper sample contained 2.6% of hate and Al-Wafd newspaper sample 
contained 3.8% of hate speech. Furthermore, the nuanced hate speech was found as follows: 
Al-Masry Al-Youm sample contained 3.3% of nuanced hate speech, Al-Ahram sample 
contained 1.8% and Al-Wafd contained 2.4%.   
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Figure 1: Hate speech overview 
 
Table 1: Hate speech according to the newspaper  
Newspaper 
Is hate speech practiced in 
the text? 
Al-Ahram 
Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Alwafd Total 
No 
F 365 303 390 1058 
% 95.5% 92.1% 93.8% 93.9% 
Yes 
F 10 15 16 41 
% 2.6% 4.6% 3.8% 3.6% 
Nuanced 
F 7 11 10 28 
% 1.8% 3.3% 2.4% 2.5% 
Total 
F 382 329 416 1127 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The following paragraph will elaborate in detail the findings of the study according to 
the major theme of the text which was analyzed and a government’s ruling period, as the 
coding was divided according to the major theme of the text, being either Arab countries, 
Western countries, or Egyptian affairs.    
Arab countries: Before discussing the findings of Arab countries as a major theme of the 
text it is important to note that sometimes there was political tensions between the Egyptian 
government and some Arab countries during the span of the study. Besides, political hate 
93.9
3.6
2.5
Is hate speech practiced in the text?
No
Yes
Nuance
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speech also includes nationalist hate speech that targets Arab countries and Arab citizens 
(Elliott et al., 2016). Therefore, despite these tensions the text was considered hate speech 
when it uses any of the hate speech types discussed before. The text context, generalizations 
and unsupported accusations were also a key used to decide if the text should be considered 
hate speech or simply reporting and/or opinions.    
Arab countries (and/or Arab citizens living in Egypt or abroad) was the major theme of the 
text for a total of 5.8% of the sample under Morsi’s rule. Hate speech used in Al-Ahram 
newspaper was 4.3% targeting Arab governments and considering them to be part of a 
conspiracy, foreign interests, or as enemies which shows that the majority of times, Arab 
countries was the major theme during Morsi’s ruling period, hate speech was used against 
them.   
 Al-Wafd newspaper used nuanced hate speech against Arab governments in 4.3% of 
its sample and no direct or nuanced hate speech was found in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. 
Similar to Al-Ahram, the results show that Al-Wafd newspaper also targeted Arabs generally 
with nuanced hate speech in the majority of the text with the major theme of Arab countries.  
Arab countries (and/or Arab citizens living in Egypt or abroad) were the major theme 
of the text for only 3.8% of the text during Mansour’s ruling period and no hate speech was 
also found in the whole sample. This shows that during this period media professionals were 
more keen not to use hate speech against Arabs in general.  
 The total of the text with the major theme of Arab countries (and/or Arab citizens 
living in Egypt or abroad) during Al-Sisi’s ruling period was 10.2%. Only 2.4% of hate 
speech was used in Al-Ahram newspaper targeting “other” (Hamas Leaders) and the hate 
speech type was discrimination. On the other hand, Al-Masry Al-Youm used 2.4% of 
nuanced hate speech generally directed against Arabs or Arab countries without specifically 
mentioning the country or the people, while it was once targeting Houthis. This figure shows 
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that during Al-Sisi’s ruling period, the media was more careful and reduced the use of hate 
speech against Arabs than during Morsi’s rule but less careful than during Mansour’s rule 
which did not use hate speech against Arabs.  
Western countries: Western countries (and/or Western citizens living in Egypt or abroad) 
were the major theme of the text for 2.7% during Al-Sisi’s ruling period. Al-Wafd newspaper 
used hate speech for 9.1% of its sample. The type of hate speech was discrimination and the 
hate speech victim was general and was not specified. No direct or nuanced hate speech was 
found when Western countries were the major theme of the text under Morsi’s and Al-Sisi’s 
ruling period, which means that during this period media professional were more careful 
while using hate speech against Western countries than during Al-Sisi’s ruling period.  
Egyptian affairs: The total number of Egyptian affairs text during Morsi’s ruling period was 
83.4%. The total amount of hate speech used was 3.3%. Hate speech in Al-Ahram newspaper 
was 0.3%, 1.2% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, and 1.8% in Al-Wafd newspaper.  
The total percentage of nuanced hate speech used was 3.6%. Al-Ahram used it for 
0.3%, Al-Masry Al-Youm used it for 1.8%, and Al-Wafd used it for 1.5%.  
The total number of Egyptian affairs as the major theme under Mansour’s rule was 
87.7%. The total amount of hate speech used was 6.1%. Al-Ahram newspaper used it for 
1.1%, Al-Masry Al-Youm for 3.2%, and Al-Wafd for 1.8%.  
The total percentage of nuanced hate speech used during the same period was 2.2%. 
Al-Ahram used it for 1.1%, Al-Masry Al-Youm used it for 0.7% and Al-Wafd used nuanced 
hate speech for 0.4%.  
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 Meanwhile, the total number of Egyptian affairs as the major theme during President 
Al-Sis’s ruling period was 77.0% and hate speech was used for 2.5%. Al-Ahram newspaper 
used 1.3% of hate speech and 0.3% was used in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and 0.9% 
was used in Al-Wafd newspaper. On the other hand, the total of nuanced hate speech was 
2.2%: Al-Ahram newspaper used it for 0.6%, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper for 0.6%, and 
Al-Wafd newspaper for 0.9%. 
Hate speech was used the most during Mansour’s ruling period followed by Morsi’s 
ruling period and finally Al-Sisi’s ruling period.   
During Morsi’s ruling period most hate speech was found the most in Al-Wafd 
newspaper followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and finally Al-Ahram newspaper. 
Nuanced hate speech was used the most in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper followed by Al-
Wafd newspaper and finally in Al-Ahram newspaper.  
During Mansour’s ruling period hate speech was found mostly in Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper followed by Al-Wafd newspaper and finally Al-Ahram newspaper. Nuanced hate 
speech was used mostly in Al-Ahram newspaper followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper 
and finally Al-Wafd newspaper.  
During Al-Sisi’s ruling period Al-Ahram newspaper used hate speech the most 
followed by Alwafd and finally Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. Nuanced hate speech was 
used the most in Al-Wafd newspaper followed by Al-Ahram newspaper and Al-Masry Youm 
newspaper who used it equally.  
“Other” as a major theme: ‘Other’ was chosen when the major theme of the text was about 
other countries and not among the choices given in the codebook or about other topics not 
related to a specific country, such as, for example, entertainment, or religion.  
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“Other” was the major theme of the text for 4.8% of the sample. Hate speech was 
used by 1.9% under Morsi’s ruling period in Al-Wafd newspaper and 2.6% nuanced hate 
speech was used under Mansour’s rule in Al-Ahram newspaper and 1.8% hate speech was 
found in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper under Al-Sisi’s rule.  
Types of hate speech   
Stereotyping was the major type of hate speech found in the sample during the three 
successive governments, which means that the victims of hate speech were mostly subject to 
generalizations and prejudice as mentioned before in the literature review by Roginsky & 
Tsesis (2016). People targeted by generalization or stereotyping might believe allegations 
made against them (Ring, 2013). An example of stereotypical hate speech was considering a 
whole Islamists group as terrorists and accused them for a terrorist attack in Egypt. However, 
the news story did not support the accusation through any source or facts, also, there was no 
mention of official investigations. At the meantime, the same news story mentioned that 
another militant group announced their responsibility of the terrorist attack, but the news 
story still accused the Islamist group. Taking all this into consideration the news story was 
considered stereotypical mainly for generalizing against the group and considering all of 
them as terrorists without supporting the statement. Also, if the news story just mentioned 
that the attack was carried by terrorists without specifying a group, especially before the 
official investigations and any support of the accusation, it would have not been considered 
as hate speech. Another stereotypical hate message was considering all “revolutionaries as 
infidels.”  
Threaten was also used during the rule of the three successive governments which 
means that hate speech sources did not clearly incite for violence but only threatened using 
words like “You should stop what your group is doing or else...”. “…our patience is coming 
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to an end” (Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012) and so on. An example, of threaten hate speech was 
saying “revenge is coming-up,” where the hate speech sources were implying that if their 
demands are not met they will revenge. Since, that they did not clearly mention or incite for 
violence the text was considered threaten.  
Dehumanization was used during Morsi’s and Mansour’s governments. An example 
of Dehumanization was when an individual spitted on another’s photo and placed his shoes 
on it. Another example is when the hate speech source was saying “media professionals are 
such waste pipes that are overflowing.” Dehumanization takes the form of attacking other 
individuals or groups’ dignity (Roginsky, & Tsesis, 2016). The context of these messages 
was considered to be attacking the dignity of hate speech victims, especially that in the 
Arabic context it has negative meaning that degrades others dignity.   
Religious extremism was only used during Morsi’s ruling period, which is clear since, 
during this period, the government was represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and there 
was polarization between Islamist and secularist media, according to El Issawi (2014). An 
example of religious extremism was saying that all “liberals and secularists are infidels; 
executing them for apostasy is a must.” The source of this hate message was attacking others 
based on religious arguments according to the source’s claim. As religious extremism refers 
to threatening others and limiting their rights based on religious arguments (Ianto-Petnehazi, 
2012) this message was considered hate speech.  
Discrimination was used during Mansour’s rule, which refers to any speech that 
discriminates, advocates, or rationalizes discrimination, which is “any differentiation, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on group appartenance and any other criteria, 
(Ianto-Petnehazi, 2012). The discriminative message used was saying that Americans should 
get out of Egypt, this message was considered discriminative because it calls for the 
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exclusion of a certain group from the country and might incite hate towards members of this 
group.  
The sources of hate speech during Mansour’s and Al-Sisi’s ruling periods used the 
conspiracy/foreign interest/enemies type of hate speech, which suggests that hate speech 
victims were framed as people working against the country’s or society’s interests and 
serving foreign, evil interests against their own country. An example of this type of hate 
speech was considering those who call for protesting to be implementing a conspiracy that is 
supported by “international terrorist and Zionist groups.” This gives negative connotations 
that they are serving foreign and evil interests especially that the text used words that might 
have strong negative impact like “terrorism” and “Zionism” and the text was also not 
supported by any facts to support the claim.  
In addition, using violence and isolation types of hate speech during Mansour’s and 
Al-Sisi’s ruling period shows the framing of hate messages was extreme against the victims 
and suggested that they do not have the right to live in the country and in some cases, 
violence against them was justified or even encouraged. An example of violence is when 
some protesters threatened revenge and assured that the country will witness a bloodbath 
while others were holding different discriminatory signs including one that states “whoever 
will burn our Holy Book, we will burn their Holy Book and heart.”  
 The following paragraphs will elaborate more on the types of hate speech used and 
their percentage.  
Stereotyping (26.1%) is the major type of hate speech used during Morsi’s ruling 
period followed by dehumanization (13%), religious extremism (8.7%), and last is threaten 
(4.3%).  
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Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper used stereotyping for 8.7% and Al-Wafd newspaper 
used it for 17.4%. Dehumanization was used in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper for 4.3% and 
in Al-Wafd newspaper by 8.7%. Religious extremism, however, was used in Al-Masry Al-
Youm newspaper by 4.3% and Al-Wafd newspaper by 4.3%. Finally, threaten was used in 
4.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper’s sample.  
 The major type of hate speech used during Mansour’s ruling period was stereotype 
(47.8%), followed successively by threaten (13%), violence (13.0%), conspiracy, foreign 
interest, and enemies (8.7%), dehumanization (4.3%), discrimination (4.3%), isolation 
(4.3%), and other (4.3%) which was xenophobic hate speech against Americans.  
Stereotype was used in Al-Ahram newspaper for 13.0%, Al-Masry Al-Youm 26.1%, 
and Al-Wafd newspaper 8.7%. threaten were used in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper by 8.7% 
and in Al-Wafd newspaper by 4.3%. Violence was used in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper by 
8.7% and 4.3% was used in Al-Wafd newspaper. “Conspiracy, foreign interest, and enemies” 
was used in Al-Wafd newspaper by 8.7%. At the same time, all the percentage of 
dehumanization was used by 4.3% in Al-Wafd newspaper. Also, all the percentage of 
discrimination was in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper by 4.3%, isolation in the same 
newspaper by 4.3% and the “other” xenophobic hate speech was also found in Al-Masry Al-
Youm newspaper by 4.3%.  
During Al-Sisi’s ruling period, stereotyping was the major hate speech used (33.3%) 
followed by conspiracy, foreign interest, and enemies (20.0%), then violence, threaten, and 
isolation were used equally by or for (6.7%).   
Stereotypes were used by 26.7% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 6.7% in Al-Wafd 
newspaper. Violence was used by 6.7% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. Isolation was used 
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in Al-Wafd newspaper by 6.7% and threaten were used by 6.7% in Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper. Conspiracy, foreign interest, and enemies were used by 20.0%, divided between 
Al-Ahram newspaper by 6.7% and was used in Al-Wafd newspaper by 13.3%. 
RQ2: Who is the source of hate speech? 
This question aims to show that newspapers are only the channel that transmits hate 
speech, while the source is not necessarily the journalist, but it may differ as hate speech 
sources might have an agenda that they seek to implement and have issues they want people 
to think about. As mentioned before, the agenda-setting theory suggests that there are 
different factors that set the agenda including social ideologies and the psychology of 
journalists, politicians, public officials, public relation practitioners and other individuals 
including the presidents (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). This clarifies the fact that more than 
one person can be involved in setting the agenda, and therefore more than one person can be 
the source of hate speech.  
 However, the research results show that Egyptian journalists (including wire service 
professionals and reporters) were at the top of the list as hate speech sources in the three 
newspapers and during the ruling period of the three successive governments through the 
time span of the study which clarifies the fact that the majority of the people who were trying 
to impose hate are the journalists, followed by other sources.  
As shown in “table 2”, this study found that Egyptian journalists used hate speech for 
2.6%, followed by Egyptian governmental officials who used hate speech for 1%. Then 
Egyptian Islamists totaled 0.6% as the source of hate speech. Other Egyptian interviewee or 
quoted sources used hate speech for 0.4%, Egyptian religious scholars used hate speech for 
0.2%, foreign journalists used it for 0.3%, foreign governmental officials used hate speech for 
0.2%, foreign religious scholars used hate speech for 0.1%, other foreign interviewee or 
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quoted sources were the source for hate speech by 0.3% while other sources counted for 0.1% 
as the source of hate speech.  
Table 2: Hate speech source  
 Who is the source of hate speech? F % 
0 1058 93.9% 
Egyptian Journalist (reporter, wire service... 
etc). 
29 2.6% 
Egyptian Governmental official 11 1% 
Egyptian Religious scholar 2 0.2% 
Egyptian Islamists (including Muslim 
Brotherhood members and Salafists) 
7 0.6% 
Other Egyptian interviewee or quoted source 5 0.4% 
Foreign Journalist (reporter, wire service... 
etc) 
3 0.3% 
Foreign Governmental official 2 0.2% 
Foreign Religious scholar 1 0.1% 
Other Foreign interviewee or quoted source 3 0.3% 
Other 1 0.1% 
Total 1127 100 
Source of hate speech according to ruling government 
 The major sources of hate speech were also Egyptian journalists during the rule of the 
three different governments followed by other sources that were different under each ruling 
government. This enforces the fact that Egyptian journalists are the major source in setting a 
hate agenda towards others, followed by other sources.  
The major hate speech sources during Morsi’s ruling period were Egyptian journalists 
or wire service professionals (1.8%), followed by Egyptian Islamists (1.5%), Egyptian 
governmental officials (1%), and both Egyptian and foreign sources coded under ‘other 
interviewee’ or ‘quoted source’ were equal (0.5%), followed by foreign journalists, wire 
service professionals or reporters (0.3%), and finally by foreign governmental officials 
(0.3%).       
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The 1.8% of hate speech used by Egyptian journalists (wire service professionals, or 
reporters) are divided between 0.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and 1.5% in Al-Wafd 
newspaper. The 1.5% used by Egyptian Islamists are 0.8% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper 
and 0.8% in Al-Wafd newspaper. On the other hand, the 1% hate speech used by Egyptian 
governmental officials was 0.3% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 0.8% in Al-Wafd newspaper. 
Meanwhile, Egyptian ‘interviewee or quoted sources’ were the source of hate speech only in 
Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and counted for 0.5%. Also, foreign interviewee sources were 
found as the source of hate speech by 0.5% in Al-Wafd newspaper. In addition, foreign 
governmental officials were the source of hate speech by 0.3% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 
finally foreign journalists, wire service professional or reporters were the source of hate 
speech by 0.3% in Al-Wafd newspaper. 
During Mansour’s ruling period, the major source of hate speech was journalists 
(4.7%). These were followed by Egyptian governmental officials (1.6%) and finally, by 
Egyptian religious scholars, Egyptian Islamists, foreign interview sources, and other sources 
who were equally the source of hate speech (0.3%). 
The 4.7% hate speech used by Egyptian journalists, wire service professionals, or 
reporters is divided as follows: 1.3% in Al-Ahram newspaper, 1.9% in Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper, and 1.6% in Al-Wafd newspaper. The 1.6% hate messages used by Egyptian 
governmental officials are distributed between Al-Ahram newspaper by 0.6%, Al-Masry Al-
Youm newspaper 0.6% and 0.3% in Al-Wafd newspaper. Both Egyptian religious scholars 
and Egyptian Islamists were the source of hate speech for 0.3% each in Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper. Both Egyptian interviewee sources and foreign interviewee sources were the 
source of hate speech for 0.3% in Al-Ahram newspaper.   
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During Al-Sisi’s rule, Egyptian journalists were also at the top of the list of hate 
speech sources at 1.7%. They were followed by Egyptian governmental sources, other 
Egyptian interviewee or quoted sources at 0.5%. Finally, religious scholars, foreign 
governmental official, and foreign religious scholar followed at 0.2%.  
 The 1.7% of Egyptian journalists, wire service professionals, or reporters used hate 
speech by 1% in Al-Wafd newspaper, 0.5% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 0.2% in Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper. In addition, Egyptian governmental sources used hate speech by 0.5% 
only in Al-Masry Al-Youm. The 0.5% of hate speech used by “other Egyptian interviewee 
sources” are divided by 0.2% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 0.2% in Al-Wafd newspaper. The 
0.5% of hate speech used by foreign journalists, wire service professionals or reporters were 
used in Al-Ahram newspaper by 0.2% and in Al-Wafd newspaper by 0.2%. The hate speech 
used by foreign governmental officials found in Al-Ahram newspaper for 0.2%. Foreign 
religious scholars used hate speech by 0.2% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. Finally, 
Egyptian religious scholars used it for 0.2% in Al-Wafd newspaper.  
In short, the results show that disseminating hate against others was an agenda item 
implemented by Morsi’s government generally as Egyptian Islamists and Egyptian 
governmental officials were the major source of hate speech after the journalists. However, it 
is important to note that Islamists were also the major targets of hate speech during this 
period. As mentioned in the literature review, despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood 
tried to control and manipulate the media but they faced difficulty in doing so as they were 
opposed by many.   
Similarly, during Mansour’s ruling period, journalists came first and were followed 
by Egyptian governmental officials as the major source of hate speech, which also reinforces 
the fact that the government was trying to disseminate hate towards others. However, 
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Egyptian Islamists, and religious scholars were also equally the source of hate speech, which 
only supports the fact that hate speech is used by different sources to target their opposition.    
Likewise, during Al-Sisi’s ruling period, Egyptian journalists were the major hate 
speech source, followed by Egyptian governmental sources and other Egyptian interviewee 
or quoted sources. This also supports the argument that the governmental agenda was leaning 
towards using hate speech against others.  
RQ3: Does the media practitioner try to combat the speech if it is used by the source? 
Since newspapers are the channel used to transmit hate speech, it is important to note 
that media professionals try to combat this speech. Even if the role of the media professionals 
is to deliver the message, they should also be keen to oppose it or interview other sources to 
oppose hate messages (Eissa, Kasseb & Elias, 2016). This is especially true because some 
journalists are used by “racist groups” to implement their “political propaganda,” which 
results in the media being used as a weapon for intolerance (White, ND). Despite the 
importance of combating hate speech, this study found that the media professionals generally 
did not try to combat hate speech. This result is easily predictable since the major sources of 
hate speech were the journalists themselves.  
To explain this finding in more detail, journalists did not try to combat hate speech 
during 99.7% of the times when hate speech was used and they tried to combat hate speech 
only in 0.3% of the times when hate speech was used.  
 
 
 
 116 
Table 3: Did the media practitioner combat hate speech?  
Ruling regime 
Did the media practitioner try to combat 
hate speech? 
Morsi Mansour Al-Sisi Total 
No 
F 395 317 412 1124 
% 99.5%  100%  99.8%  99.7%  
Yes 
F 2  1 3 
% 0.5%   .2%  0.3%  
Total 
F 397 317 413 1127 
% 100%  100%  100%  100%  
 
During Morsi’s ruling period, 99.5% of the times when hate speech was used, the 
journalists did not try to combat it and only in 0.5% of the stories that used hate speech did 
the journalists try to combat it. Journalists tried to combat hate speech in Al-Masry Al-Youm 
newspaper by 0.3% of the times and 0.3% of the times was in Al-Wafd newspaper. During 
Mansour’s ruling period, 100% of the stories that used hate speech were not opposed by the 
journalists. During Al-Sisi’s ruling period, journalists did not try to combat hate speech in 
99.8% of the times when hate speech was used. However, journalists tried to combat hate 
speech only in 0.2% of the times and this was found in Al-Ahram newspaper.  
Table 4: Combating hate speech according to government and newspaper 
Newspaper 
Other 
Al-
Ahram 
Al-Masry 
Al-Youm 
Alwafd Total 
Morsi 
No 
F 150 123 122 395 
% 37.8% 31.0% 30.7% 99.5% 
Yes 
F - 1 1 2 
% - 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 
Total 
F 150 124 123 397 
% 37.8% 31.2% 31% 100% 
Mansour No 
F 98 93 126 317 
% 30.9% 29.3% 39.7% 100% 
Total 
F 98 93 126 317 
% 30.9% 29.3% 39.7% 100% 
Al-Sisi 
No 
F 133 112 167 412 
% 32.2% 27.1% 40.4% 99.8% 
Yes 
F 1   1 
% 0.2%   0.2% 
Total 
F 134 112 167 413 
% 32.5% 27.1% 40.4% 100% 
 
 117 
This data is supported by the literature review which tackled the unprofessionalism of 
the media in Egypt which, as argued, can increase the use of hate speech with no clear 
attempts to fight it as shown by the results. Also, the polarization and politicization used by 
the media might encourage journalists to use hate speech. Unfortunately, the results even 
show that it is the journalists themselves who should advocate for human rights and freedom 
and yet, they can violate such rights through using hate speech, as the majority of hate speech 
sources were journalists and the majority of them did not try to fight hate speech when it was 
used by other sources.     
RQ4: Did the victims of hate speech differ according to different governments (Morsi, 
Mansour and Al-Sisi) and how?  
Islamists, protesters, oppositional parties or groups were targeted by hate speech 
during the rule of the three governments while liberal and/or secularist forces were targeted 
by hate speech only during Morsi’s and Al-Sisi’s ruling periods. Also, religious minorities, 
media professionals, Port Said citizens, and revolutionary forces and activists affiliated with 
the June 30 protests were the victims of hate speech during Morsi’s ruling period in some of 
the text. Ethnic groups were only targeted by hate speech during Al-Sisi’s ruling period. Ain-
Shams University students in general, Syrians, a comedy TV presenter, American and 
Egyptian citizens and workers in American companies, restaurants and embassies in Egypt 
were the victims of hate speech in some of the text during Mansour’s ruling period.  
Islamists were the victims of hate speech with the highest percentage during the rule 
of the three governments. Therefore, this study is similar to Zahra’s (2014) suggestion that 
the media in Egypt supported hatred against Islamists. Also, liberal and/or secularist political 
forces were targeted by hate speech during Morsi’s and Al-Sisi’s ruling periods. This 
enforces the argument that hate speech sources direct their hate messages towards those who 
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oppose them and that hate speech in the newspaper was not only targeting groups opposing 
the government.   
This means that sometimes hate speech victims were the same during the rule of the 
three governments and sometimes they were different. However, it is clear that mainly 
oppositional groups and Islamists were the major targets of hate speech in the whole sample. 
It is also important to note that Islamists might be the major target of hate speech because, 
during the span of this study, many of the news items were about them.     
Since oppositional groups were targeted by hate speech during the rule of the three 
successive governments, the results are in accordance with Elliott et al., (2016) who said that 
political hate speech is mainly directed against political groups due to their political views 
and targets Egyptian oppositional figures. The results also show that the agenda implemented 
during the time span of the study was to direct public opinion towards hating these groups 
and the groups were framed in a negative way which directs the audience to also think about 
them negatively. This is also supported by Zahra (2014) who said, as mentioned in the 
literature review, that one of the reasons for using hate speech is the competition to win 
among political parties and their belief that winning can only be achieved through getting rid 
of the other.  
Morsi: During Morsi’s ruling period, the majority of hate speech victims were Islamists 
(13.0%) followed by liberal and/or secularist forces and protesters (8.7%). Also, opposing 
political parties were equally targeted by hate speech like religious minorities (4.3%). Other 
targets of hate speech were media practitioners, Port Said citizens, and revolutionary forces 
(generally and with no mention of affiliation or ideology), and nuanced hate speech targeted 
activists affiliated with the June 30 protests.  
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Mansour: Islamists were also the major target of hate speech during Mansour’s ruling period 
(52%). They were followed by protesters (8.7%), then opposing political parties (4.3%). 
Furthermore, some of the texts targeted Ain-Shams University students in general, Syrians, a 
Comedy TV presenter, American and Egyptian citizens and workers in American companies, 
restaurants and embassies in Egypt (4.3% each).  
Al-Sisi: The major victims targeted by hate speech during Al-Sisi’s ruling period were 
Islamists (33.3%) followed by protesters (6.7%). Hate speech victims coded as “other” 
(13.3%) were oppositional groups in general and an initiative associated with a Muslim 
Brotherhood member that allegedly aims to resolve the conflict between MB and the 
government. Nuanced hate speech also targeted Islamists (28.6%), followed by liberal and 
secularist forces (14.3%), then by protesters, opposing political parties, and ethnic groups 
(14.3% each).  
Further Data Details:  
Morsi: Hate speech used against Islamists under Morsi’s ruling period was 13.0%. 
Out of this percentage, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper used hate speech against Islamists for 
4.3% and Al-Wafd newspaper used 8.7%. On the other hand, the 8.7% of the hate speech was 
used against liberal and secularist forces as follows: 4.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper 
and 4.3% in Al-Wafd newspaper. Also, 8.7% of hate speech targeted protesters in Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper, while 4.3% of the hate speech targeted opposing political parties in the 
same newspaper. Finally, hate speech was used against religious minorities by 4.3% in Al-
Wafd newspaper and targeted Christians.  
 The term “other” was chosen by the coders when the hate speech victims were not 
among the given choices and 17.4% of the hate speech was coded under ‘other.’  Out of this 
 120 
percentage, 13.0% was found in Al-Wafd newspaper and it targeted media practitioners, Port 
Said citizens, and revolutionary forces (in general with no mention of affiliation or ideology) 
and 4.3% was in Al-Ahram newspaper where the text was mainly about kidnappers and their 
supporters but the overall context the of the text was causing confusion between kidnappers 
and the opposition generally.  
Most of the nuanced hate speech, 58.3%, used during Morsi’s ruling period was 
directed against Islamists: 25.0% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and 33.3% in Al-Wafd 
newspaper. Al-Masry Al-Youm directed 8.3% of the hate speech against activists affiliated 
with the June 30 protests and “other” was chosen for 8.3% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 16.7 
in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper.    
Mansour: Hate speech used against Islamists during Mansour’s ruling period was 
52.2%. Out of this percentage, 4.3% was found in Al-Ahram newspaper, 26.1% in Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper, and 21.7% in Al-Wafd newspaper. In addition, 8.7% of the hate speech 
was used against protesters as follows: 4.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper and 4.3% in 
Al-Wafd newspaper. Hate speech that targeted opposing political parties in Al-Wafd 
newspaper was 4.3%. Also “other” was chosen as the target of hate speech by 26.1%. Out of 
this percentage, 8.7% was in Al-Ahram newspaper and the victims were Ain-Shams 
University students in general and Syrians who were equally targeted, both by 4.3%. ‘Other’ 
was further coded by 13% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper: 4.3% of them were in Al-Wafd 
newspaper against the Egyptian comedian TV presenter, 4.3% about America and 4.3% about 
Egyptian citizens and workers in American companies, restaurants and embassies in Egypt.  
On the other hand, the total number of nuanced hate speech acts that was used during 
Mansour’s ruling period was directed against Islamists by 66.7%. These were equally 
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targeted in Al-Ahram newspaper and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper by 33.3%. “Other” was 
chosen as the victims of nuanced hate speech by 16.7% in Al-Ahram newspaper.  
Al-Sisi: The hate speech that targeted Islamists during Al-Sisi’s ruling period was 
33.3 % with 26.7% in Al-Ahram newspaper and 6.7% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. 
Hate speech that targeted protesters in Al-Wafd newspaper was 6.7 % while 13.3% of hate 
speech was coded ‘other’; 6.7% in Al-Ahram newspaper targeted oppositional groups 
generally and 6.7% in Al-Wafd newspaper targeted an initiative associated with a Muslim 
Brotherhood member that allegedly aims to resolve the conflict between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the government.   
Islamists were targeted by nuanced hate speech by 28.6% with 14.3% in Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper and 14.3% in Al-Wafd newspaper. Liberal and secularist forces were 
also targeted by 14.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. Ethnic groups were targeted in Al-
Ahram newspaper by 14.3%. Protesters were also the victims of nuanced hate speech by 
14.3% in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper as well as opposing political parties who were 
targeted by 14.3% in the same newspaper. “Other” was chosen for 28.6% in Al-Wafd 
newspaper.  
VI.3 Conclusion 
 
 First, it is important to note that there is shortage of hate speech studies, especially in 
the Egyptian media. Besides, studies previously conducted about hate speech in Egypt 
focused on a short time span and analyzed samples that were different from the ones analyzed 
in this study; therefore, it was a challenge for this research to compare its results with 
previous studies. Also, different media and human rights organization reports focused on 
broadcast media and used hate speech examples more from broadcast than from newspapers. 
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This is probably due to the fact that broadcast has more apparent hate speech as it is 
disseminated to a wider audience as compared with newspapers. Hate speech is also 
widespread through social media and is probably more so than in traditional media. 
According to Ring (2013), the Internet is the most accessible media platform unlike 
traditional media, and any person with an Internet connection and a computer can transmit 
information easily. Ring (2013) adds that hate messages frequently appear in social media 
too. The nature of the Internet makes it easy for the messages to be transmitted around the 
world and it becomes permanent in the Internet unless the user decides to take the message 
offline and simply delete it (Holschuh, 2014). In spite of this, it was important to study 
newspapers due to their importance especially in setting the agenda and in affecting and 
influencing peoples’ behavior. In addition, using hate speech generally with limited or high 
percentage may have a negative impact on hate speech victims and the society as a whole.  
The majority of hate speech found in this research is in the privately-owned Al-Masry 
Al-Youm newspaper, then the party-owned Al-Awafd newspaper, and finally in the state- 
owned Al-Ahram newspaper. As hate speech is used against some groups, this shows that 
negative effects of hate speech may occur.  
Moreover, major types of hate speech found through the sample are stereotyping, 
threaten, dehumanization, religious extremism, discrimination, conspiracy/foreign 
interest/enemies, violence and isolation.  
Also, the results showed that Egyptian journalists were at the top of the list of hate 
speech sources followed by other sources. Such results might suggest that the governmental 
agenda leans towards disseminating hate speech. However, also other sources including the 
opposition were sometimes the source of hate speech. Therefore, this study supports the 
argument that hate speech sources generally target groups opposing them, regardless of 
whether the source of hate speech is in power or not.    
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The major groups targeted by hate speech generally did not change through the three 
successive governments, as they were mainly Islamists, but in other cases, the victims were 
oppositional groups like protesters. Finally, journalists in general did not try to combat hate 
speech.  
 
VI.4 Proposed Solutions to Fight Hate Speech   
As suggested before, there is a lack in finding one unified definition of hate speech. 
Therefore, it is a challenge to find ways to combat hate speech. In addition, limitations on 
hate speech might affect freedom of expression and might be used by the governments 
against media professionals or citizens who try to voice their opinion through the media, 
therefore, this section will propose solutions that might be useful to fight hate speech, trying 
to avoid governmental laws.  
As this study showed that journalists are the major hate speech source, it is important 
to provide solutions to fight hate speech by raising journalist’s awareness. Journalists might 
use hate speech due to the lack of professional and practical training, therefore, it is suggested 
that they receive training and learn more about hate speech, human rights, ethical and 
professional media standards. This could be done through universities, media organizations, 
or media civil society associations. As mentioned before by Zahra (2014), media practitioners 
should learn about human rights and should receive training on how to differentiate between 
freedom of speech and hate speech, which will help them to avoid the use of hate language.  
Journalists might also use hate speech to implement their own agenda, or as a means 
to express their own opinion by using this speech against individuals or groups that they 
personally oppose. They could also use it to implement the newspaper agenda or even the 
governmental agenda. This is also due to the lack of professional and ethical awareness, 
therefore media training is important to raise media professional’s awareness on the 
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importance of objectivity and separating personal opinions from facts. Journalists and media 
professionals must also understand the negative effects of using hate speech and how it can 
harm individuals, society, or even lead to civil wars. Education is the most important tool to 
train people to avoid hate speech, because as Lenkova (1998) mentioned hate speech is 
caused by ignorance and lack of education. Therefore, educating media professionals is 
important to avoid hate speech. Zahra (2014) even suggests that hate speech topic should be 
addressed in schools which shows how important is education even from early stages.   
Zahra (2014) mentioned that the media should have clear standards on its messages to 
avoid hate speech. This paper suggests that this could be implemented through media 
organizations who should clearly define the link between hate messages and free speech and 
media organizations should also have a clear code of ethics that media professionals must 
abide by. White (ND) further stresses that journalists must act according to the code of ethics 
and not only memorize it. Journalists can also use the code of ethics as a “checklist” 
especially when working with tight deadlines (White, ND).   
Media organizations also have a role in raising awareness about accepting other’s 
opinions and cultures. As Zahra (2014) stated before, the media should provide time and 
space in the media outlets to encourage cultural debates and the acceptance of other’s 
opinions. Also, in some cases journalists might not even report about hate speech used by 
other sources if it might inflame violence. In such cases, journalists and media organizations 
should balance between reporting and informing people about what was said by the source 
and the consequences the hate message might cause. Also, if journalists decided to report 
about hate speech used by the source it is important to carefully and wisely choose the words 
and how to phrase and to frame the message and they should combat this hate message by 
another one opposing it to avoid any negative consequences of the hate speech.  
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One of the reasons that might encourage journalists to use hate speech is lack of self-
regulations by journalists and media organizations or even being blamed after using hate 
speech. For example, when the TV anchor clearly used hate speech against Egyptian 
Christians, she continued working and the head of the news department at this time 
considered her incitement to violence as only being “politically emotional.” Limitations 
should be imposed by media organizations that should totally reject the use of hate speech, 
strictly prohibit and penalize it. Like media organizations, also, the Syndicate of Journalists 
and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation should play a role in coming-up with code of 
ethics and in setting limitations against the use of hate speech by defining what hate speech is 
and rejecting any kind of hate speech usage and at the same time, securing and protecting 
freedom of expression. As it is important to avoid any kind of impingement to freedom of 
expression also media professionals should cooperate in creating the code of ethics or vote 
for it to ensure that it will not affect their reporting and freedom of expression.  
Self regulation is also important for media organizations as they should view their 
work to make sure that their messages do not include hate speech, and the media 
organizations should refuse to use any kind of hate speech. In addition, as the role of media 
professionals is being objective in delivering the message, they should also be keen not to 
cause harm. Therefore, journalists should learn how to fight hate speech when it is used by 
sources through, opposing the hate speech used by interviewing other sources to oppose it. 
This is especially important because the results of the study showed that media professionals 
did not try to fight or oppose hate speech used by the sources. Sikorskaya and Gafarova 
(2014) also mentioned that most of the experts believe that hate speech must be encountered 
by another kind of speech that aims to inform the audience and eliminate deception, bias, 
stereotypes and fear of others which will affect public opinion positively. This is also 
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supported by the marketplace idea, which suggests that when different opinions are presented 
the public will choose the truth.  
Civil society associations and media organizations should cooperate to fight hate 
speech. They should also start social campaigns to raise awareness against hate speech and 
this campaign can be disseminated by different media outlets. Also, the audience might have 
a role through sending reports to the civil society about hate speech. The civil society can 
investigate further and contact the journalist or media outlet to remove the hate message and 
apologize to the public. This way hate speech awareness will not only be limited to 
journalists and media organizations but also the public. In addition, they should also 
encourage communication with those perceived as “the other” and encourage them to speak-
up about themselves to eliminate stereotypes about them.  
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Chapter VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
VII.1 Recommendations  
As there is a lack of hate speech studies in Egypt, further studies should be conducted 
to have deeper understanding of the phenomena. 
 This study used content analysis, which only describes the presence of hate speech 
and how groups are framed in the different periods of the rule of presidents. It aims to be a 
starting point for further studies to understand the effects and impact of hate speech on both 
the victims and the audience. It is also important to understand whether hate speech has an 
impact on the newspapers readers and victims or not. Therefore, further studies should 
include surveys and in-depth interviews to understand the possible effects of hate messages 
on individuals and groups targeted by those messages, to understand, as well, how hate 
messages affect the audience exposed to them and understand their attitudes and perspective 
towards these messages and hate speech victims. For example, does hate messages alter the 
audience behavior, attitude, and perspective towards the victims or not?  
The study showed an overview of hate speech in Egyptian newspapers through 
analyzing only the front pages. However, further studies might investigate a narrower sample 
of the same study period to have a clearer view of the phenomenon. For example, more 
stories and articles should be analyzed to understand if there is hate speech in the story itself 
or not, as front pages mostly consist of overviews of the major news only. Besides articles 
should be examined to know if opinion articles writers use hate speech or not.  
 While the main focus of this study is newspapers due to their importance in attracting 
a wide audience (Webb, 2014), in setting the public agenda (Abdulla, 2013), and in affecting 
people’s behavior, it is also important to analyze other media outlets too. Including online 
news websites and TV and radio in order to explore wider and different types of news stories 
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that is disseminated to wider audience especially with the literacy rates in Egypt. Different 
segments should be analyzed including news programs and talk shows, which will help 
exploring more topics. In addition, the same time frame should be explored through 
conducting a comparative study between newspapers and broadcast to understand the overall 
role of the media, rather than newspapers only. It is further important to investigate hate 
speech in social media and understand how hate speech in traditional media is reflected in the 
social media.  
VII.2 Limitations 
This research used few previous studies to have an overview of hate speech studies 
and how are they conducted. However, due to the shortage of research on hate speech in 
Egypt, this study was challenged to find general data and examples from previous concrete 
scientific studies to follow their steps as a guideline for a new study and as a way to avoid 
challenges and difficulties previous researchers faced.  
In addition, there are different factors that might affect the results of the study, which 
discussed next and the ways the researcher and coders tried to overcome.  
Due to the lack of a unified definition of hate speech, what is considered hate speech 
in one study could be considered opinion in another one, so if the same sample is analyzed by 
different researchers the outcome might differ, depending on each researchers’ choice of 
operational definitions. The context of the speech was always taken into consideration while 
analyzing the newspapers to avoid confusing hate speech with news or expression of 
opinions. Therefore, what is considered hate speech in one text might not be considered hate 
speech in another one. 
As discussed earlier, it is important to notice that after the 25th of January revolution, 
the media scene was generally unprofessional (El Issawi, 2014). It witnessed polarization and 
politicization (Elliott et al., 2016). The media under Morsi’s ruling period was polarized 
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(Abdulla, 2014) while, after his isolation, the majority of private and state-owned media 
outlets were advocating for “pro-military propaganda” and extreme patriotism, according to 
Webb (2014). However, the coders tried not to confuse hate speech with any bias, 
unprofessionalism, or simply freedom of expression especially that, as argued in the literature 
review, there is already a debate as to whether hate speech is considered freedom of 
expression or not and sometimes both might overlap. Also, operational definitions and 
generalization were the main keys to differentiate between bias, unprofessionalism and hate 
speech.      
The time period of this study was also critical as it witnessed political turmoil, 
imbalance and the Egyptian streets witnessed different protests and some showed anger 
towards the succeeding governments, which was sometimes reflected in the media. 
Newspapers covered these protests and had their own negative expressions in describing 
certain political scenes or figures, as well as sources and opinion writers who sometimes 
expressed their anger. Coders were keen not to confuse the negative framing of certain events 
and expressing anger towards political groups or individuals with hate speech, by adhering to 
the operational definition.   
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process in the arab world (Rev., 2nd ed.). Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press. 
Rupar, V. (2012). Getting the Facts Right: Reporting Ethnicity and Religion'Media Diversity 
Institute. 
Sailer, M. (2013, July, 16). Egypt's military regime tolerates xenophobia. Deutsche Welle 
(DW). Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/egypts-military-regime-tolerates-
xenophobia/a-16952496 
Sakr, N. (2014). Arab Television Today. London: I.B.Tauris. Retrieved from 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=677031 
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of communication, 
49(1), 103-122. 
 145 
Sevasti, C. (2014). Social media and political communication: Hate speech in the age of 
twitter. (Masters Thesis. Erasmus University of Rotterdam). Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/17740 
Sharma, R. (2012). News on the rocks: Exploring the agenda-setting effects of blood 
diamond in print and broadcast news. Media, War & Conflict, 5(3), 239-253. 
doi:10.1177/1750635212447909 
Shrader, C. R., (2003). The muslim-croat civil war in central bosnia: A military history, 
1992-1994 (1st ed.). College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 
Sikorskaya, I. & Gafarova, S. (2014). Hate speech in the media and the Internet. School of 
Peacemaking and Media Technology 
Simpson, R. M. (2013). Dignity, harm, and hate speech. Law and Philosophy, 32(6), 701-
728. doi:10.1007/s10982-012-9164-z  
State Information Service, (ND). Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014. 
Retrieved from http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf  
Straus, S. (2007). What is the relationship between hate radio and violence? rethinking 
rwanda's “Radio machete”. Politics & Society, 35(4), 609-637. 
doi:10.1177/0032329207308181 
Sundstrom, R., & Kim, D. (2014). Xenophobia and racism. Critical Philosophy of Race, 2(1), 
20-45. 
Supreme Council of Press (ND). Kanon Rakam 96 li-Sanat 1996 Bi Sha’an Tantheem Al-
Sahafa [Law number 96 for the year 1996 for regulating the press]. Retrieved from 
 146 
http://www.scp.gov.eg/Images/App_PP/DeskTop/App_Web/1/MyWebMedia/PDFDo
cs/PressLow.pdf 
Supreme Council of Press (ND). Mithak Al-Sharf Al-Sahfy wa Mithak Al-Iilan Al-Sahfy 
[Press charter of honor and press charter of advertising honor]. Retrieved from 
http://www.scp.gov.eg/Images/App_PP/DeskTop/App_Web/1/MyWebMedia/PDFDo
cs/PressCode.pdf   
Tan, Y., & Weaver, D. H. (2009). Local media, public opinion, and state legislative policies: 
Agenda setting at the state level. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 14(4), 
454-476. doi:10.1177/1940161209336225 
Taylor, M., & Kent, M. L. (2000). Media transitions in bosnia: From propagandistic past to 
uncertain future. Gazette, 62(5), 355-378. doi:10.1177/0016549200062005002 
Tewksbury, D & Scheufele D. A. (2009). News Framing Theory and Research. In J. Bryant 
& M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media Effects Advances Theory and Research (17-33). New 
York: Routledge. 
Thomson, S. M. (2009). Ethnic twa and rwandan national unity and reconciliation 
policy.Peace Review, 21(3), 313-320. doi:10.1080/10402650903099377 
Trew, B. (2015, May, 17). How distaste of LGBT people in Egypt has turned into state-
sponsored persecution. Independent UK. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-distaste-of-lgbt-people-
in-egypt-has-turned-into-state-sponsored-persecution-10256869.html  
United Nations. (ND). International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General 
 147 
Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 entry into force 4 January 
1969, in accordance with Article 19 Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx  
United Nations. (ND). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.pdf 
United Nations. (ND). Universal Declaration of Human Rights- In six cros-cutting themes. 
Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/CrossCuttingThemes.aspx  
United Nations. (ND). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf  
United States. (1990) The united states bill of rights: The ten original amendments to the 
constitution of the united states passed by congress september 25, 1789, ratified 
december 15, 1791. Champaign, III: Project Gutenberg.  
Webb, E. (2014). Media in egypt and tunisia: From control to transition?. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
White, A. (ND), Ethical Challenges for Journalists in Dealing with Hate Speech. The Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Retrieved 
from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Vienna/CRP8White.pdf 
Wimmer, R. D., & Dominick, J. R. (2011). Mass media research: An introduction (9th, 
International ed.). United States;Australia;: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
Wu, H. D., & Coleman, R. (2009). Advancing agenda-setting theory: The comparative 
strength and new contingent conditions of the two levels of agenda-setting effects. 
 148 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(4), 775-789. 
doi:10.1177/107769900908600404 
Yong, C. (2011). Does freedom of speech include hate speech? Res Publica, 17(4), 385-403. 
doi:10.1007/s11158-011-9158-y 
Zahra, W. (2014). Inni Akrahok: Khitab Al-Karahiya wa Al-Ta’fya Fi I’lam Al-Rabie Al-
Arabi’ [I Hate You... The Hate and Sectarianism Speech in Media after Arab Spring]. 
Retrieved from http://www.books4arab.com/2015/09/pdf_10.html  
  
 149 
Appendix 
Codebook  
 
Use of Hate Speech in Egyptian Arabic Language Newspapers * Required 
1. Coder ID * 
Choose: 1- Yasmine/ 2- Sarah  
2. Name of newspaper * 
Choose: 1- Al-Ahram / 2- Al-Masry Al-Youm / 3-Alwafd  
3. Year of publication * 
Choose: 1- 2012 / 2- 2013 / 3- 2014 / 4- 2015  
4. Date of publication * 
Example: December 15, 2012 
5. Ruling regime at the period of publication * 
Choose: 1- Morsi / 2- Mansour / 3- Al-Sisi  
6. Document ID (write down the number of the document) * 
7. Title of the text (write down the title of the text) * 
8. What is the type of the text? * 
Choose: 1- News story/ 2- Feature story / 3- Headline (When only headline is provided 
without a story)/4- Headline with quotes or sub-headlines / 5- Other  
9. What is the major theme of the text? * 
Choose: 1- Arab countries or Arab citizens in Egypt or abroad/ 2- Western countries or 
Western citizens in Egypt or abroad / 3- Egyptian affairs (including sports) /4- Other  
1 After the last question in this section, skip to question 11. 
2 After the last question in this section, skip to question 31. 
3 After the last question in this section, skip to question 51. 
4 After the last question in this section, skip to question 91. 
10. Other major theme of the text 
If another country is the major theme of the text, please mention it 
Arab Countries’ or Citizens’ Overview 
11. Which Arab country or Arab citizen mentioned? * 
Choose: 1- Saudi Arabia/ 2- Qatar/ 3- Palestine / 4- Syria / 5- N/A (If text is general and does 
not a mention a country precisely)/ 6- Other (If you chose other please mention the country in 
the next question). 
12. Other Arab country 
13. Is hate speech practiced in the text? * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 2- Nuanced (text leaning toward hate speech but there is no clear hate 
speech type used) / 0- No  
1 Skip to question 17. 
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2 Skip to question 14. 
0 Stop filling out this form. 
Arab Countries’ or Citizens’ (Nuanced Hate Speech) 
14. Where is hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only / 2- Story only / 3- Both / 4- Other  
15. Who is the target of vague hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- Arab government (Including president, king, ministers etc.)/ 2- Arabs living in 
Egypt/ 3- Arab citizens living in the Arab country/ 4- Arab experts/ 5- Arab human rights 
organizations/ 6- N/A (general not specified)/ 7- other (If you chose other please mention 
who in the next question).  
16. Other (Please mention who is the target of hate speech) 
Skip to question 92. 
Arab Countries’ or Citizens’ Details 
17. Where is hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only / 2- Story only / 3- Both / 4- Other  
What type of hate speech is practiced? 
18. Nationalist hate speech *  
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
19. Discrimination * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
20. Violence (including Incitement of violence and/or rationalizing it) * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
21. Dehumanization * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
22. Slurs * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
23. Threaten * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
24. Religious extremism * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
25. Conspiracy/Foreign interests/Enemies * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
26. Stereotype * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
27. Other * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No (If yes write hate speech type in the following question)  
28. Other 
Hate Speech Victims 
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29. Who is the target of hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- The Arab government (Including the president or king, ministers etc.) / 2- Arabs 
living in Egypt / 3- Arabs citizens living in the Arab country / 4- Arab experts / 5- Arab 
Human rights organizations / 6- N/A (General, not specified) / 7- Other (If you chose other 
please mention in the next question).  
30. Other (Please mention who is the target of hate speech) 
Skip to question 92. 
Western Countries’ or Citizens’ Overview 
31. Which Western country or Western citizen is mentioned? * 
Choose: 1- USA / 2- Germany / 3- Russia / 4- N/A (If text is general and does not mention a 
country precisely) / 5- Other  
32. Other Western Country 
33. Is hate speech practiced in the text? * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 2- Nuanced (text leaning toward hate speech but there is no clear hate 
speech type used) / 0- No  
1 Skip to question 37. 
2 Skip to question 34. 
0 Stop filling out this form. 
Western Countries’ or Citizens’ (Nuanced hate speech) 
34. Where is hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only / 2- Story only / 3- Both / 4- Other  
35. Who is the target of hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- Western Government (Including the president, ministers etc.) / 2- Western 
citizens living in Egypt/ 3- Western citizens living in the Western country/ 4- Western 
experts/ 5- Western Human rights organizations / 6- N/A (General, not specified) / 7- Other 
(If you chose other please mention who in the next question)  
36. Other 
Skip to question 92. 
Western Countries’ or Citizens’ Details 
37. Where is hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only / 2- Story only / 3- Both / 4- Other  
What type of hate speech is practiced? 
38. Xenophobic hate speech *  
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
39. Discrimination * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
40. Violence (Including incitement of violence and/or rationalizing violence) * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
41. Dehumanization * 
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Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
42. Slurs * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
43. Threaten * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
44. Religious extremism * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
45. Conspiracy/Foreign interests/Enemies * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
46. Stereotype * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
47. Other * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No (If yes write hate speech type in the following question)  
48. Other 
Hate Speech Victims 
49. Who is the target of hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- The Western Government (Including the president, ministers etc.) / 2- Western 
citizens living in Egypt/ 3- Western citizens living in the Western country/ 4- Western 
experts/ 5- Western Human rights organizations / 6- N/A (General, not specified) / 7- Other 
(If you chose other please mention who in the next question).  
50. Other 
Skip to question 92. 
Egyptian Affairs Overview 
51. Is hate speech practiced in the text? * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 2- Nuanced (text leaning toward hate speech but there is no clear hate 
speech type used)/ 0- No  
1 Skip to question 65. 
2 Skip to question 52. 
0 Stop filling out this form. 
Egyptian Affairs (Nuanced hate speech) 
52. Where hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only/ 2- Story only/ 3- Both / 4-Other  
Who is the target of hate speech? (Vague hate speech in Egypt) 
53. Ethnic groups * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
54. Women * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
55. Islamists (including Muslim Brotherhood members and Salafists) * 
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Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
56. Liberal/Secularist political forces * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
57. Activists affiliated with 25 January revolution * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
58. Activists affiliated with 30 June protests * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
59. protesters * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
60. Opposing political parties * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
61. National Democratic party (NDP) * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
62. Other * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
63. Religious minorities * 
Choose: 1- Yes/ 0- No  
1 Skip to question 64. 
0 Skip to question 92. 
Religious Minority nuanced text 
64. Which religious minority is targeted by hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- Christians / 2- Jews / 3- Bahai's / 4- Shia/ 5- Other  
Skip to question 92. 
Egyptian Affairs Details 
65. Where is hate speech practiced? * 
Choose: 1- Headline only/ 2- Story only/ 3- Both / 4-Other  
What type of hate speech is practiced? 
66. Discrimination * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
67. Violence (including Incitement of violence and/or rationalizing violence) * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
68. Dehumanization * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
69. Isolation * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
70. Stereotype * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
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71. Slurs * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
72. Threaten * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
73. Religious extremism * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
74. Conspiracy/Foreign interests/Enemies * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
75. Shame of the country * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
76. Other * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No (If yes write hate speech type in the following question)  
77. Other 
Who is the target of hate speech? 
78. Ethnic groups * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
79. Women * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
80. Islamists (including Muslim Brotherhood members and Salafists) * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
81. Liberal/secularist political forces * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
82. Activists affiliated with 25 January revolution * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
83. Activists affiliated with 30 June protests * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
84. Protesters * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
85. Opposing political parties * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
86. National Democratic Party (NDP) * 
Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
87. Other * 
Choose: 1-Yes/ 0-No (If yes write who is the target of hate speech in the following question)  
88. Other (mention the target of hate speech) 
89. Religious minorities * Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No  
1 Skip to question 90. 
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0 Skip to question 92. 
Skip to question 92. 
Religious Minorities 
90. Which religious minority is targeted by hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- Christians / 2- Jews / 3- Baha'is / 4- Shia / 5- Other  
Skip to question 92. 
Other (Major theme of the text) 
91. Is hate speech practiced in the text? * 
Choose: 1-Yes/ 2- Nuanced (text leaning toward hate speech but there is no clear hate speech 
type used) /0-No  
0 Stop filling out this form. 
Hate Speech Source 
92. Who is the source of hate speech? * 
Choose: 1- Egyptian Journalist (reporter, wire service... etc). / 2- Egyptian Governmental 
official / 3- Egyptian Expert / 4- Egyptian Religious scholar / 5- Egyptian Activists / 6- 
Egyptian liberal/secularist political parties/ 7- Egyptian Islamists (including Muslim 
Brotherhood members and Salafists), 8- Other Egyptian interviewee or quoted source/ 9- 
Foreign Journalist (reporter, wire service... etc). / 10- Foreign Governmental official / 11- 
Foreign Expert / 12- Foreign Religious scholar / 13- Foreign Activists / 14- Foreign 
liberal/secularist political parties/ 15- Other Foreign interviewee or quoted source/ 16- NA 
(Not clear) 17- Other  
93. Other (Mention the source of hate speech) 
94. Did the media practitioner try to combat hate speech? * 
(Through interviewing other opposing sources or opposing and criticizing hate speech 
expressed by others or the source) Choose: 1- Yes / 0- No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
